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This dissertation is composed of two empirical studies on mutual funds. Chapter 1
studies the implication of the timing of mutual fund entry for subsequent long-term fund
performance. As fund companies choose when to open new funds and what investment
styles they practice, these choices may be informative about the fund qualities. I empiri-
cally explore the relation between entrant fund performance and past style performance.
By examining a sample of 2,801 mutual fund entrant during the period of 19912015, I
nd that entrant funds with investment styles that have recently performed well tend to
underperform in the future. The post-entry performance of hot style entrants is worse
than both the post-entry performance of cold style entrants and the concurrent perfor-
mance of incumbents in the same style categories. The empirical ndings are unlikely
to be driven by stock-level return reversals or competition among mutual funds, but
consistent with fund investors practicing style investing and extrapolating their beliefs
on style returns, leading to lower entry thresholds for fund managers in hot investment
styles.
vi
Chapter 2 includes my joint work with David Xiaoyu Xu on how regulations in
the Chinese stock market can aect investor behavior in the mutual fund market. We
show that trading suspension, a regulatory policy on stock trading activities, gives rise to
stale mutual fund NAVs and indirectly aects fund investors' behavior. Using a sample
of 3,205 long-term trading suspension events in China during 20042018, we nd that
opportunistic investors combine rm-specic news and fund portfolio reports to make
investment decisions. Quarterly fund ows positively respond to suspended portfolio
stocks' unrealized impact on fund NAVs. Such responses are stronger for impactful good
news, and portfolio disclosure plays a key role in this mechanism. Our ndings suggest
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Chapter 1
Style Timing and Performance of Mutual Fund
Entrants
1.1 Introduction
The U.S. mutual fund industry has seen enormous growth in the past few decades.
Mutual funds have become an important investment vehicle for U.S. households to man-
age their nancial wealth.1 While investors nowadays have thousands of mutual funds
to choose from, hundreds of new funds are still opened each year.2 Given the plethora
of choices of funds and the churning in the industry, one might wonder if we could learn
anything about the properties of newly opened funds based on their entry decisions.
In this study, I attempt to oer an angle to take on the above question by study-
ing the connection between the timing of fund entry and the performance of newly
oered funds. Just like rms considering launching new products need to decide on the
specications of the products and the timing of entry, mutual fund companies also en-
dogenously choose what types of funds to oer and when to oer them. Understanding
whether the entry decision made by fund companies reveals how funds perform in the
1According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI), the total net assets managed by mutual
funds grew from USD 134.8 billion in 1980 to USD 17.7 trillion in 2018. Collectively, U.S. households
put 21% of their total nancial wealth in mutual funds at year-end 2018.
2There are 8,078 mutual funds at year-end 2018. 345 are newly opened in 2018.
1
future could potentially help investors make better investment decisions, and inform us
about what drives the industry dynamics.
As a theoretical starting point, in a perfectly competitive market for mutual
funds, if investors are fully rational (Berk and Green, 2004), then fund performance
should be unrelated to the timing of fund entry. New funds are oered when fund
companies expect them to perform well enough to attract sucient investor ows such
that the expected fee revenue would cover the cost of setting up and running the funds,
justifying the entry decision. Rational investors would competitively supply capital ows
to new funds such that they always expect to earn zero net alpha. Therefore, post-entry
performance of entrant funds would not depend on the timing of entry.
However, the premise that investors are fully rational has already been challenged
by a ripe literature on behavioral economics. Several aspects of the eld are particularly
relevant and applicable to the context of investment in mutual funds. First, people often
group situations or objects into coarse categories to make inferences (Mullainathan,
2002). Investors may categorize risky assets into dierent styles and make allocations
among styles based on their relative attractiveness (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). In the
market for mutual funds, it is natural for investors to categorize funds into styles when
making investment decisions. Mutual funds often advertise their investment strategies
in terms of dierent investment styles such as small-cap, large-cap, value, and growth.
Fund names usually also reect the investment styles adopted by the funds, or the
industry sectors their strategies focus on.3 In addition, analytical tools widely used by
3For example, the prospectus of Fidelity Small Cap Value Fund (FCPVX) states the following in
its ve-bullet-point description of its principle investment strategies: investing at least 80% of assets
2
fund investors, such as Morningstar and Lipper, present data and market information
on mutual funds to users by classifying funds into dierent style categories.
Second, investors form beliefs by extrapolating their recent past experiences.4
When considering a newly opened fund that belongs to a particular style category, in-
vestors may be too optimistic about its expected future performance because funds in
that style category have generally performed well recently. Incorporating these two
simple and reasonable behavioral elements into the theoretical analysis gives rise to in-
teresting deviations from the implications of the rational benchmark. Investors' thinking
in categories implies that the entry threshold for funds is specic to each fund style cate-
gory rather than common to all funds. Further, their extrapolative beliefs lead to a link
between past style performance and style-specic entry thresholds. New funds in a style
category would eectively face a lower entry threshold in terms of their true abilities to
generate abnormal returns if the recent style performance has been high.
I formalize my intuition in a simple competitive equilibrium model that incorpo-
rates the two behavioral elements, and contrast its implications to those of the rational
benchmark. While the benchmark model implies time-invariant entry threshold and ir-
in securities of companies with small market capitalizations and investing in securities of companies
that Fidelity Management & Research Company (FMR) believes are undervalued in the marketplace
in relation to factors such as assets, sales, earnings, growth potential, or cash ow, or in relation to
securities of other companies in the same industry (stocks of these companies are often called "value"
stocks).
4For example, Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer (2018),
and Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007) emphasize the relation between extrapolative beliefs and asset
bubbles, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Alt and Tetlock (2014), and Barberis, Greenwood, Jin,
and Shleifer (2015) study asset pricing implications of extrapolative beliefs. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1994), La Porta (1996), La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), and Benartzi (2001)
nd empirical evidence consistent with overextrapolative expectations. Greenwood and Shleifer (2014)
present survey evidence for extrapolative expectations.
3
relevance of timing of entry for fund performance, the alternative model generates style-
and time-specic entry threshold and predicts negative correlation between post-entry
fund performance and past style performance.
The empirical content of this chapter focuses on testing the relation between
entrant fund post-entry performance and past style performance in the sample of U.S.
active equity funds opened between 1991 and 2015. Using stock characteristics of initial
fund holdings to classify entrant funds into dierent style categories, I nd a negative
correlation between the post-entry performance of entrant funds and the past perfor-
mance of their styles. In particular, funds opened at times when their styles are hot on
average underperform by around one percentage point per year in the rst three years
following fund inception compared to funds in the same style categories but opened
during cold periods. When the magnitude of past style performance is considered, the
average annual post-entry performance in the rst three years is around 20 basis points
lower for entrant funds when the annual style return adjusted for market return is one
percent higher in the past two years.
One potential alternative explanation for the lower post-entry fund performance
for entrant funds in episodes following high past style performance could be the well-
documented return reversal eect at both the stock-level and the style-level (De Bondt
and Thaler, 1985; Teo and Woo, 2004; Kumar, 2009). The increased intensity of compe-
tition among funds in the same style category due to newly opened funds may also be a
reason for the observed underperformance (Wahal and Wang, 2011; Hoberg, Kumar, and
Prabhala, 2017). Although it is reasonable to believe that both alternative mechanisms
could be at play in this context, they are supposed to aect both the entrant and the
4
incumbent funds in the same style category in the same manner. To distinguish from
these explanations, I further examine whether the dierence between the performance
of entrant and incumbent funds in the same style category are related to past style
performance, and again nd a negative correlation. This lends credibility to the entry
threshold eect that is expected to only aect entrant funds as a separate mechanism
that causes underperformance of hot style entrant funds.
The contribution of this work nests under a large literature devoted to under-
standing the investment management skills of mutual funds (Wermers, 2000; Fama and
French, 2010) and investment performance earned by fund investors (Malkiel, 1995; Gru-
ber, 1996; Zheng, 1999). The novelty of this study is that it focuses on the extensive
margin of fund entry. By relating fund entry decision to performance of entrant funds,
it proposes a mechanism through which market conditions can shift the distribution of
investment skills and performance of existing funds, and provides consistent empirical
evidence.
This study draws insights from and builds upon studies on style investing (Bar-
beris and Shleifer, 2003; Teo and Woo, 2004; Cooper, Gulen, and Rau, 2005; Froot and
Teo, 2008; Kumar, 2009; Boyer, 2011). However, none of the existing studies have linked
past style performance to fund performance through the eect of fund entry decisions.
On the subject of fund entry, Khorana and Servaes (1999) examine the deter-
minants of mutual fund openings and nd that the recent performance of funds with a
particular investment objective, among other factors, is positively associated with likeli-
hood of future fund openings in that investment objective. However, they do not further
explore the implications of this determinant on the subsequent performance of entrant
5
funds. Two other papers also share this study's focus on the performance of newly
opened funds. De Souza (2019) nds that new funds that hold popular stocks at birth
tend to underperform. Chuprinin and Ruf (2017) nd that new funds that invest heavily
in past winner stocks tend to underperform. My study diers from these two in that I
examine the relation between style-level returns, rather than stock returns, and entrant
performance, hence raising a distinct mechanism to explain entrant fund performance.
In Section 1.2, I construct a model to formalize the intuition that leads to the main
hypothesis of the chapter. Section 1.3 describes the data used for the empirical analysis in
detail. Section 1.4 presents the main empirical ndings. Robustness checks are included
in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 presents additional ndings that explore alternative notions
of investment styles and hotness of styles. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Model
This section presents a simple model of fund entry to illustrate the intuition
behind the hypotheses in this chapter. The model adopts from the canonical compet-
itive partial equilibrium model for mutual funds and fund investors (Berk and Green,
2004). The main extension to the original model is that I separate the component of
fund performance due to managers' investment abilities from that due to average style
performance. This allows me to consider the role of fund style and the relation between
model outcome and style performance. I rst introduce the framework of the model, and
then consider two dierent assumptions on investor beliefs. In the rst case, I assume
investors are fully rational. In the second, investors are assumed to have extrapolative
beliefs on style performance. I analyze and contrast the model implications on fund
6
entry decisions and post-entry fund performance in both cases.
1.2.1 Model Setup
Consider a model with two dates, t ∈ {0, 1}. At date t = 0, a group of fund
managers with dierent investment management abilities, am, drawn from a distribution
F , arrive at the market as potential entrants. Each of them, knowing her own ability,
decides whether to open a new fund that operates for one period by incurring a one-time
xed setup cost of C upfront. Investors allocate their money to funds after fund entry
decisions are made at t = 0. The fund receives a xed management fee f for each dollar
it manages at t = 0, and will be liquidated at t = 1.
1.2.1.1 Fund Alpha
The gross alpha generated by a fund, rt+1, is determined by the following pro-
duction function:
rt+1 = a
m + ast+1 − bqt, (1.1)
where am is manager's investment ability, ast+1 is the average performance of the fund's
investment style s, b is a positive constant that captures decreasing returns to scale
(Berk and Green, 2004; Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik, 2004; Lewis, 2015; Harvey and
Liu, 2017), and qt is the fund's assets under management at date t. The separation of
the terms am and ast+1 distinguishes the component of fund alpha due to the manager's
superior stock-picking ability from that due to the investment style adopted by the fund
(Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997; Wermers, 2000). In addition to man-
agers' abilities to pick stocks, some investment styles may on average perform better
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than others during certain periods. I capture this additional component of alpha pro-
duction by adding the time-varying style performance term ast+1. The style performance
component in fund alpha varies over time and is assumed to be i.i.d. with zero mean,
i.e., Et[ast+1] = 0,∀t.
1.2.1.2 Investor Flow
As in Berk and Green (2004), the supply of investment talent is scarce and
investors competitively allocate their capital to mutual funds. In equilibrium, investors
expect to earn zero net alpha from their investment. Using EIt [·] to denote investors'
expectation at t, we have
EIt [rt+1]− f = EIt [am] + EIt [ast+1]− bqt − f = 0. (1.2)
This zero net alpha condition due to competitive supply of capital determines the equi-
librium size of a fund at date t:
qt =




The entry decision hinges on whether a potential entrant expects to earn sucient
fee revenue to cover its initial xed cost:
q0f ≥ C. (1.4)




+ f − EI0[as1]. (1.5)
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In equilibrium, investors' expectation for managers' abilities, EI0[am], should be the con-
ditional mean of those managers who choose to enter. This implies an entry threshold
for manager ability, am∗, which solves the following equation (1.6) such that all mangers
with higher abilities will nd it protable to enter the market.
E[am|am ≥ am∗] = bC
f
+ f − EI0[as1]. (1.6)
Note that investors' beliefs about the style performance appear on the right-hand side of
(1.6) and will have an inuence on the determination of the entry threshold for manager
abilities.
1.2.2 Rational Benchmark
Given the framework above, I rst consider the implications for fund entry and
entrant performance under the assumption that investors are perfectly rational. Rational
investors correctly perceive that the style performance component has no persistence,
i.e., EI0[as1] = 0. Immediately, (1.6) becomes
E[am|am ≥ am∗] = bC
f
+ f. (1.7)
In this case, the entry threshold am∗ does not depend on style performance. Substituting
EI0[am] = E[am|am ≥ am∗] and EI0[as1] = 0 into (1.3), the equilibrium fund size at t = 0 is
q0 =








The average post-entry net alpha earned by fund investors is









As in the canonical Berk and Green (2004) model, rational investors on average earn
zero net alphas from their investment in mutual funds.
The following proposition summarizes the model implications on fund entry and
post-entry performance under the rational benchmark.
Proposition 1. If investors have rational beliefs, the fund entry threshold, am∗, and the
average post-entry fund performance do not depend on past style performance, as0.
1.2.3 Extrapolative Beliefs on Style Performance
Now suppose investors are not fully rational, and they believe that the expected
protability of an investment style would continue to be high (low) if they observe high
(low) past style performance. In other words, investors over-extrapolate the style-level
performance. To capture this, I assume that investors believe that style performance
is persistent, i.e., EIt [ast+1] = θast , where θ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant that captures the
persistence perceived by investors. In contrast to the previous subsection where investors
are rational, now the substitutability of manager ability and style protability in the
gross alpha production function (1.1) implies that the entry threshold for manager ability
will be lower when investors believe that the style is going to continue its recent high
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performance. To see this, substitute EI0[as1] = as0 into (1.6):
E[am|am ≥ am∗] = bC
f




+ f − θas0.
(1.10)
Note that style performance in the period prior to t = 0, as0, appears on the right-hand
side of (1.10). The solution for am∗ is smaller when as0 is larger. Compared to the rational
benchmark, the entry threshold now depends on the style s adopted by the potential
entrant, and is lower when the past performance of the style is higher. Applying (1.3),
the equilibrium size of entrant funds at t = 0 is
q0 =












The average post-entry net alpha earned by fund investors is










Although the equilibrium fund size in (1.11) is the same as that in the rational
benchmark, investors no longer earn constant zero net alpha on average. Instead, the
average post-entry fund performance depends on past style performance, and is lower
when past style performance is higher. This dierence from the rational benchmark is
mainly driven by the dierence in the entry threshold am, which leads to dierence in
the E[am|am ≥ am∗] term. When past style performance is high, the entry threshold is
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lower, making it easier for managers with lower abilities to open new funds and expect to
break even. Hence, the average manager ability is lower for cohorts of entrants following
a time period when style performance is high. These cohorts of new funds on average
perform worse in the future.
Proposition 2 states the relation between entry threshold and past style perfor-
mance under the assumption of extrapolative beliefs.
Proposition 2. If investors have extrapolative beliefs on past style performance, the
fund entry threshold am∗ and the average post-entry performance of entrant funds are
both decreasing in the past style performance as0.
1.2.4 Model Conclusion
The analyses of the model under dierent assumptions about investor rationality
show how fund entry and post-entry fund performance may be related to fund style and
past style performance. In the rational benchmark, the entry threshold for manager
abilities and post-entry fund performance do not depend on the timing of entry with
regard to recent past style performance. When investors have biased extrapolative beliefs
about future style performance, the entry threshold is lower for an investment style if the
style has recently performed well, which leads to lower average manager ability for the
cohort of entrants with that investment style. Consequently, these entrants on average
perform worse in the future. In the remainder of this chapter, I study empirically whether





The sample of mutual funds used for empirical analyses is constructed by com-
bining data on fund return and characteristics from CRSP, and fund holdings data from
both Thomson Financial and CRSP. The coverage of the initial sample begins in 1980,
for which holdings data is rst available, and ends in 2018. I start by including funds
in CRSP that have investment objective codes designated by data vendors indicating
that they invest primarily in U.S. equity securities, and discarding index funds.5 This
sample is then merged with Thomson Financial holdings database using MFLINKS avail-
able from WRDS. Several researchers have found that the Thomson holdings database
has quality and coverage issues for the later part of the sample period, especially after
2008 (Shive and Yun, 2013; Zhu, 2019). Therefore, for funds that are initially selected
from CRSP but do not have a valid match in the Thomson database, I further look for
holdings information in the CRSP holdings le and include the linked data points in
my sample when available.6 These selection criteria result in 5,282 unique funds with
returns, characteristics, and holdings data available from 1980 to 2018.
The date of entry for a fund is identied as the date when the rst share class
of the fund series is oered.7 To construct a sample of entrant funds, I further require
5Funds that have Lipper class codes in 'EIEI', 'LCCE', 'LCGE', 'LCVE', 'MCCE', 'MCGE', 'MCVE',
'MLCE', 'MLGE', 'MLVE', 'SCCE', 'SCGE', 'SCVE', Strategic Insight objective codes in 'AGG',
'GMC', 'GRI', 'GRO', 'ING', 'SCG', or Wiesenberger objective codes in 'SCG', 'G', 'LTG', 'MCG',
'GCI', 'G-I' are considered as equity funds. A fund is regarded as an index fund if the CRSP variable
index_fund_ag equals `D' (pure indexing), or if its name contains index, dow, s&p, or nasdaq.
6Appendix A.1 provides further details for this procedure.
7Section 1.5.1 explores alternative ways to measure fund entry date.
13
that a newly established fund has at least one holdings snapshot available within the
rst 24 months following its inception date. This requirement is to ensure that my
holdings-based style classication can reliably measure the style category of the fund
perceived by investors at the time of fund inception. The full sample of entrant funds
starts from 1982 because the main empirical analyses uses style performance in the past
two years to determine the hot and cold status of style category at the time of fund
entry. The sample ends in 2015 to allow for at least 3 years of post-entry observation
for fund performance evaluation. These restrictions leave me with a sample of 2,927
entrants from 1982 to 2015.
The rst four columns in Table 1.1 display the number of incumbent funds and
entrant funds in the sample. The mutual fund industry experienced rapid growth in the
1990s. Annual numbers of entrants dwindled during the years around the nancial crisis
in 2008, but have recovered to about 100 entrants per year since then.
1.3.2 Holdings-Based Investment Styles
I classify funds into a set of investment style categories based on the average
characteristics of their stock holdings. This approach is consistent with both academic
research and industry practice. Motivated by the relation between stock characteristics
and the cross-sectional variation in stock returns (Daniel and Titman, 1997), Daniel,
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) propose using characteristic-sorted stock port-
folios as benchmarks for mutual fund performance evaluation. Likewise, analysts and
investors in the industry often use Morningstar style boxes to categorize fund investment
styles when evaluating their performance.
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I use the two most widely recognized dimensions of stock characteristics, size
and book-to-market, to categorize fund investment styles. Mutual funds often describe
their investment strategies in terms of these two dimensions, and many adopt names to
directly reect how their investment strategies are tilted on these two dimensions. In
the literature on style investing, other empirical studies also primarily focus on the these
two style dimensions (Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok, 2002; Teo and Woo, 2004; Cooper,
Gulen, and Rau, 2005; Froot and Teo, 2008; Kumar, 2009) and use them to designate
styles for stocks.
Following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), in July of each year,
I assign all stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq into 5×5 bins by rst dividing
them into ve groups based on NYSE market capitalization quintile breakpoints, and
then sorting each group into quintiles by their Fama-French 48 industries-adjusted book-
to-market ratios. Each stock receives a size score range from 1 (small) to 5 (large) and
a book-to-market score from 1 (growth) to 5 (value). The style scores for stocks are
maintained for the next 12 months until they are calculated again in the next July.
For each fund holding snapshot observed, I calculate the value-weighted average size
score and book-to-market score for the eective date of the holdings observation. In
each year, I sort the incumbent funds by their size scores and book-to-market scores
calculated from their rst holdings observations within the year, and compute the 33rd
and 67th percentile cutos on for both scores. The size score cutos are used to assign
incumbent and entrant funds into small, mid, and large size categories. Similarly, the
book-to-market score cutos are used to assign funds into growth, blend, and value
categories. At any point of time, a fund in the sample is assigned one of the nine
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investment styles that combines the two dimensions of classications. For example, if
an entrant fund's size score falls between the 33rd and the 67th percentile of the size
scores, and its book-to-market score is below the 33rd book-to-market score percentile
of the incumbents, it will be considered as a mid growth fund at entry.
Using the style classications, Table 1.1 further breaks down the number of en-
trant funds in the sample by their investment styles for each year. Casual observation
suggests that the proportions of funds introduced in dierent, especially opposing, styles
vary over time. There are notably more growth funds than value funds opened in most
years in the 1990s. After 2000, however, more value funds are introduced in the early
2000s, suggesting that the popularity of value compared to growth styles have shifted
during this period. The change in the landscape of mutual fund styles during this period
is likely related to the rise of internet stocks in the 1990s and the following burst of tech
bubble around 2000.
Although data availability permits the entrant fund sample to span the period
from 1982 to 2015, the rst few years in the sample account for a relatively small number
of fund entries. Most years from 1982 to 1990 see less than 20 entrant funds per year.
The detailed breakdown of the sample by style categories shows that there is no entrant
funds in some style categories during this period. Since this imbalance of observations
among years in the sample may aect the precision of statistical inference from some
of the empirical tests, I focus on the sample period of 19912015 for inference and
interpretation in the main body of this chapter. This subsample includes 2,801 out of
2,927 entrant funds of the full sample. The full results of the same tests using the full
19822015 sample are reported in Appendix A.2.1 for completeness.
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1.4 Results
1.4.1 Performance of Entrant Funds in Hot and Cold Styles
The primary mission of the empirical exercise is to test whether there is a negative
correlation between the performance of entrant funds and the past performance of their
investment styles. I start by comparing the post-entry performance of hot style entrant
funds and that of cold style entrant funds. An investment style is considered as hot at a
particular time if the dierence between the TNA-weighted average return of all funds
in that style category in the past 24 months and the return on the value-weighted CRSP
index over the same time window is above the time-series median for the entire sample.
This denition of hot versus cold style is meant to capture the time-series variation of
attractiveness specic to each style. Entrant funds are classied as hot or cold style
entrants based on whether the investment styles they initially adopt are hot or cold at
the time of their entries.
1.4.1.1 Two-Sample t-Test
Panel A of Table 1.2 shows the distribution of the number of hot and non-hot
entrants across dierent style categories. Overall, 1,463 out of 2,801 entrant funds are
considered hot style entrants. Across dierent style categories, there are generally more
fund entries when the style is hot, except for Large Blend and Large Value.
To measure the post-entry performance, I calculate the average fund return over
the value-weighted CRSP index return, the CAPM alpha, the Fama-French 3-factor
alpha, and the Cahart 4-factor alpha over the 36-month window following the fund in-
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ception date.8 If a fund is terminated within the rst 36 months following the fund
inception date, it would still be kept in this sample to avoid survivorship bias as long
as there are enough return observations to calculate all of the above measures. Panel
B to E of Table 1.2 compare various performance measures between hot and non-hot
style entrants and report the results of two-sample t-tests. When all funds are consid-
ered, hot style entrants on average perform worse than cold style entrants by all four
performance measures. The performance dierences are statistically and economically
signicant. The dierence in average performance between hot and cold entrants is
around 8 basis points per month measured by CAPM alpha, and around 6 basis points
per month measured by 3-factor or 4-factor alpha. Breaking down the sample by style
categories reveals more details on the comparison between hot and cold style entrants
within each investment style. The dierences in performance are negative for the major-
ity of style categories, and are never statistically signicant when they are positive. It is
noteworthy that the underperformance of hot style entrants tend to be more prominent
for investment styles oriented towards small-cap and growth strategies.
1.4.1.2 Regression Tests
The two-sample t-tests help to shed light on within style category comparisons but
treat each subsample separately and estimate standard deviation of fund performance
dierently in each subsample. To draw a better inference on the full sample while
focusing on the entry timing eect by comparing funds in the same style category that
8The month of fund entry is excluded from the calculation even if monthly return is available for
that month.
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enter the market at dierent times, I next turn to a regression approach that includes
style xed-eects. Table 1.3 reports the results of a battery of regressions of post-entry
fund performance measured over 12-, 24-, 36-, and 60-month windows on a dummy
variable indicating whether a fund enters the market when its style is in hot status.
Style xed-eects are included in all specications to focus on the entry timing eect on
subsequent fund performance within style categories. For statistical inference, I cluster
standard errors by style-year groups. This method of clustering accounts for potential
correlation among residuals in performance for entrants that enter the same style at the
same time.9 Across all specications, the regression coecients suggest that hot style
entrants signicantly underperform cold style entrants, and the performance dierence
is about 8 to 10 basis points per month on average.
The dichotomy between hot and non-hot styles seems to suggest that funds that
enter the market when their styles have recently performed relatively well tend to perform
worse in the future. While using a hot style dummy variable is straightforward, the actual
magnitude of style performance, in addition to whether or not it is above the sample
median, should also help explain the performance of entrant funds. I repeat the previous
regression analyses using the style-level returns, measured by the TNA-weighted average
return of incumbent funds in the style category in the previous 24 months in excess of the
value-weighted CRSP index return, as the independent variable. The ndings reported
in Table 1.4 conrm that hot style entrant funds on average perform worse than non-hot
style entrants. For example, the 4-factor alpha of a fund is on average 20 basis points
lower in the rst 3 years following fund entry compared to another fund in the same style
9Appendix A.2.2 provides a more detailed discussion on the choice of clustering method.
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category if the former enters the market when the style-level performance is 1 percentage
point higher. The empirical patterns suggest that funds that enter the market when their
styles have recently performed well on average perform worse following entry.
1.4.1.3 Returns on Buy-and-Hold Portfolios of Hot and Cold Style Entrant
Funds
Instead of treating each entrant funds in the sample as an independent observa-
tion, an alternative approach to comparing performance of hot and cold style entrant
funds is to compare performance of buy-and-hold portfolios of hot and cold style entrant
funds. Each entrant fund is added to the hot style portfolio or the cold style portfolio
in the month following its inception and held for 5 years or until the month it is closed,
whichever is earlier. Table 1.5 reports the results of using time-series regressions to com-
pare the performance of hot and cold style buy-and-hold portfolios adjusted for exposure
to Carhart four factors. For both equally weighted and value weighted portfolios, the
hot style portfolio has lower alpha than the cold style portfolio. Interestingly, hot style
portfolio also seems to have lower loading on the HML factor and higher loadings on the
SMB factor, consistent with the notion that hot style funds tend to tilt towards growth
and small-cap styles. The statistical signicance for the underperformance of hot style
portfolio is stronger for value weighted portfolios, suggesting that underperformance is
more prominent among hot style entrant funds that managed to attract larger investor
ows.
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1.4.2 Performance of Entrant Funds Relative to Incumbent Funds
While the thesis of this chapter intends to interpret the negative correlation be-
tween entrant fund performance and past style performance as evidence for dierences in
investment skills between hot and cold style entrants, there might be two alternative ex-
planations. One possible driving force underlying this correlation is the well-established
empirical observation of return reversal for stocks (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985), and
more relevantly, for stocks that belong to certain style categories (Teo and Woo, 2004;
Kumar, 2009). The negative correlation presented in the previous section could emerge
because funds in a style category inherit the return properties of stocks they hold.
Another possible explanation is that fund entries increase the intensity of competition
among funds that share similar investment styles and invest in stocks with similar char-
acteristics, thereby making it more dicult for funds in a style category to achieve good
performance (Wahal and Wang, 2011; Hoberg, Kumar, and Prabhala, 2017).
Both alternative explanations, the stock-level return reversal mechanism and the
competition mechanism, should apply to both entrant funds and incumbent funds, and
neither has dierent implications for the performance of these two groups of funds.
In contrast, if the negative correlation is at least partially driven by the lower entry
threshold when a style is in a hot period, as is proposed by this study, the dierence
between average performance of entrant funds and that of incumbent funds should also
be negatively related to recent style performance.
To investigate whether this entry threshold channel is at play, I repeat the regres-
sion analyses in the previous section by replacing the dependent variable with the dif-
ference between entrant fund performance and the TNA-weighted average performance
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of incumbent funds in the same style category. Tables 1.6 and 1.7 report the results and
show that the post-entry performance of entrant funds compared to their incumbent
peer funds is worse when fund entries occur during hot style periods. This nding could
not be attributed to stock return reversal or increasing fund competition since these
two mechanisms are supposed to aect entrant and incumbent funds in similar manners.
Instead, it is consistent with the notion that entry threshold for funds in hot styles is
lower and cohorts of funds that enter the market during hot style periods are on average
less skillful in generating abnormal performance compared to their incumbent peers.
1.5 Robustness
1.5.1 Fund Incubation and Fund Entry Date
The determination of fund entry date is an important empirical task in this study
as the exact timing of the entry may change whether a fund is treated as a hot or cold
style entrant. One potential issue with the identication of fund entry date is fund
incubation. Evans (2010) points out that a mutual fund may voluntarily choose to
operate for a period of time to build return records before deciding to oer the fund
to public investors. In the main analyses, I use fund inception date, i.e., rst_oer_dt
in the CRSP database, as fund entry date. As Evans (2010) suggests, this variable
may reect the date when a fund starts incubation instead of when it becomes available
to public investors. This will perhaps introduce errors to my measure of fund entry
date, determination of hot and cold style entrants, and post-entry fund performance. To
address this concern, I repeat the main empirical tests using the 19962006 subsample,
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for which Evans (2010) shares data10 on fund ticker creation dates that can be used as
proxies for actual dates when funds become public.
For the 1,293 entrant funds in the 19962006 subsample, Table 1.8 shows the
distribution of the length of fund incubation period, measured by the time lag between
the date of fund inception and the date of ticker creation. Over half (669) of them
created ticker symbols within one month after the funds start operation. About another
one-third (396) created ticker symbols within the rst year following fund inception.
The remaining 228 funds that created tickers more than 12 months after fund inception
are likely incubated funds.
To compare the results using the two dierent denitions for fund entry date,
I rst perform the t-tests for the dierence between hot and cold entrant performance
using the fund inception date as the entry date for the 19962006 subsample. The results
are reported in Table 1.9. This subsample test reasserts the main ndings that hot style
entrant underperform cold style entrants. I then use the ticker creation date as the fund
entry date and repeat the same tests and report the results in Table 1.10. When using
ticker creation dates as entry dates, Panel A of Table 1.10 show that more funds are
classied as hot style entrants. This is consistent with the notion that fund companies
strategically choose to open incubated funds to public at times when market conditions
are more favorable. Panels B, C, and D of Table 1.10 shows that the ndings that hot
style entrants underperform is robust to excluding incubation period from the analysis.
On average, the 36-month Carhart alphas of hot style entrants are lower by 0.12%
10This data can be found in the Internet Appendix for Evans (2010) at https://afajof.org/
wp-content/uploads/files/supplements/Internet_Appendix_for_Mutual.xls.
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per month. The dierences are negative across most style categories, except for large
growth and large blend. Similar to the baseline, the ndings of underperformance are
most prominent for small- and growth-oriented styles. Table 1.11 further demonstrates
the robustness using regressions of post-entry fund performance on the hot style dummy
variable. The sizes of the regression coecients are larger in the baseline, but the
magnitudes are still similar. Overall, excluding incubation periods leads to more funds
considered as hot style entrants, and the ndings that hot style entrants perform worse
than cold style entrants is robust to this empirical issue.
1.5.2 Exclusion of Fund Returns in the Early Stage
The fund returns in the early periods following fund inception may not be particu-
larly indicative of fund quality. Fund companies may strategically devote more resources
to nascent funds or allocate favorable IPO placements to these funds to help the new
funds grow in the early stage. Although this study's main empirical tests focus on fund
performance measured over periods of reasonable lengths such as three or ve years so
that the results are unlikely driven by early period fund returns, I further show that the
main results are robust to this concern by excluding the returns in the rst year following
fund inception from calculation of post-entry fund performance. Table 1.12 shows the
comparison of hot and cold entrant fund performance over 36 month starting from the
13th month after fund inception. The results are similar compared to Table 1.2. Ta-
ble 1.13 reports results on regressions of post-entry fund performance skipping the rst
year returns on the hot style dummy variable. The results are also similar to the ndings
in Table 1.3, both in statistical signicance and magnitude of coecients. Although the
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dierences are small, skipping the rst year returns yields slightly larger absolute values
for the coecients, suggesting that fund performance in the rst year are on average
better than longer-term fund performance.
1.5.3 Look-Ahead Bias in Determination of Hot and Cold Styles
In the main specication, the denition of hot style dummy variable compares
the style performance in the past 24 months with the median for the entire sample,
which utilizes future information not available at the time of the observation. To ad-
dress concerns on this look-ahead issue, I use the cumulative median of past 24-month
rolling window style performance as the cuto for denition of hot style dummy variable.
The distribution of hot and cold entrants are slightly dierent as shown in Panel A of
Table 1.14. Nonetheless, the overall comparison of post-entry performance of hot and
cold entrants, as well as the comparison within each style category, are consistent and
similar to the previous ndings in Table 1.2. The regressions of post-entry fund perfor-
mance on this new hot style dummy variable also deliver similar results in Table 1.15
compared to the previous ndings in Table 1.3. In particular, the coecient estimates
suggest that the three-year 3-factor or 4-factor alphas of hot entrants are lower by about
one percentage point per year on average, similar to the baseline results.
1.5.4 Use Alpha to Measure Style Performance
I previously use style returns in excess of market returns to measure style perfor-
mance. This simple measure captures investors' perception of the attractiveness of an
investment style adjusting for the overall market condition. But this choice should not
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drive the main ndings of this study. I repeat the main tests that are used to establish
the negative correlation between entrant fund performance and past style performance
by using 24-month rolling CAPM alpha as the measure of style performance. Tables 1.16,
1.17, and 1.18 report the results of the t-tests, the regressions of post-entry performance
on the hot style dummy variable, and the regressions of post-entry performance on past
style alpha, respectively. The results are similar to the previous ndings. In Table 1.18,
the sizes of coecients are somewhat larger than those in Table 1.4. Given that the
standard deviation of style alpha (0.40% per month) is slightly smaller than the stan-
dard deviation of style excess return (0.42% per month), the economic magnitudes of hot
entrant underperformance in the sample implied by these coecients are comparable.
1.5.5 Alternative Sorting Methods to Categorize Fund Styles
1.5.5.1 Dependent Sort on Size and Book-to-Market Styles
The previous ndings rely on classifying funds into size and book-to-market styles
by independently ranking their respective style scores. I show that the main ndings
are robust to using dependent sort to form style categories. To assign fund styles, I
rst determine their size category using the 33rd and 67th percentile of the size scores
in the cross section, and then determine their book-to-market category using the 33rd
and 67th percentile of the book-to-market scores within each size group. Using this
style assignment, I repeat the two-sample t-tests for post-entry fund performance for
hot and cold style entrant funds and report the results in Table 1.19. Notice that the
number of observations are more evenly distributed across the nine style bins. Similar
to the previous ndings, hot style entrants signicant underperform cold style entrants,
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especially for funds adopting investment styles tilted towards small-cap and growth
strategies. Table 1.20 repeats the comparison of hot and cold style entrants using buy-
and-hold portfolio approach, and show similar results as Table 1.5.
1.5.5.2 One-Dimensional Styles
Table 1.21 reports the results of two-sample t-tests by categorizing entrant fund
styles using only one of the two style dimensions at one time. The results are consistent
with those reported in Table 1.2 and further show that underperformance of hot style
entrant funds is most prominent in growth, blend, small-cap, and mid-cap styles.
1.5.6 Alternative Measures for Performance on Buy-and-Hold Portfolios of
Entrant Funds
When comparing the performance on buy-and-hold portfolios of hot and cold
style entrant funds in the main results section, I use Carhart 4-factor alpha to account
for return components attributed to exposure to well-known risk factors (Carhart, 1997)
as much as possible. Table 1.22 and Table 1.23 show that using CAPM alpha or the
Fama-French 3-factor alpha as alternative performance measures yield ndings consistent
with those using Carhart 4-factor alpha. The performance dierence between equally
weighted hot and cold portfolios of entrant funds is −5 basis points per month measured
by CAPM alpha, and −7 basis points per month in 3-factor alpha, compared to −5
basis points per month in 4-factor alpha reported in Table 1.5. For value-weighted
portfolios, the estimated performance dierences are both -11 basis points per month
using CAPM alpha and 3-factor alpha, the same as that using 4-factor alpha. The
statistical signicance of the dierences in performance is also similar to that of the
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estimates using Carhart 4-factor model. In both cases, the performance dierences
are statistically more signicant for value-weighted portfolios, suggesting that entrant
underperformance is more prominent for hot style funds that grow larger. For Fama-
French 3-factor model, the signs of the factor loadings on HML and SMB also suggest
that hot entrants tend to tilt their holdings more heavily towards growth and small
stocks.
1.6 Extension
In this section, I explore alternative notions of fund investment styles and the
relation between entrant fund performance and past style performance. Although intu-
itive and widely adopted in practice, using size and book-to-market characteristics to
categorize mutual funds is not the only way to think about fund styles. I consider two
other salient features of stock holdings that may be used to dene fund styles: industry
and dividend. The additional empirical ndings below may serve as external validity
exercises for the thesis of this chapter, and shed more light on the relation between
entrant fund performance and style performance.
1.6.1 Industry Concentrated Funds and Hot v Cold Industries
Aside from stock characteristics, another attribute investors often use to catego-
rize stocks is the industry that a company belongs to. Similarly, investors may categorize
mutual funds using the industries if when their portfolio holdings are heavily concen-
trated in certain industries. In the context of this chapter, industry could be considered
by investors as the investment style of mutual funds, especially for funds with industry
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concentrated portfolios. Then, by extrapolating the earlier argument in this chapter,
one might wonder whether entrant fund performance could be related to past industry
performance.
To explore this question, I examine a subsample of the 2,801 entrant funds in the
main sample that are industry concentrated. To dene industries, I follow Kacperczyk,
Sialm, and Zheng (2005) to create ten industry classications by combining similar
groups in the 48 industry classications used by Fama and French (1997). Table 1.24
shows the average weight of the ten industries in the total market portfolio over the
sample period of 19912015, as well as the average industry weight in the initial portfolios
of the 2,801 entrant funds in the sample. On average, the industry composition of the
portfolios of entrant funds is quite similar to that of the market portfolio. I dene
an entrant fund to be concentrated in an industry if the industry weight in its initial
portfolio is more than three times of the industry weight in the market portfolio at the
time of its entry and is at least 20%, or if the industry weight in its initial portfolio
is more than 50%. As a result, I nd 474 incidences of entrant funds concentrated in
certain industries and 437 distinct industry concentrated entrant funds.
For these 474 observations, I group them into hot and cold industry entrants
based on the hotness of the industry they concentrate in. I consider an industry to be
hot if the CAPM alpha of the value-weighted portfolio of all stocks in that industry in
the past 24 months is above the time-series median in the sample period. Table 1.25
shows the comparison of 36-month post-entry fund performance of hot and cold industry
entrants. Overall, there are more hot industry entrants than cold industry entrants.
Some industries have more prominent presence in this sample than others. The most
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represented industries are business equipment and services, consumer non-durables, and
wholesale and retail. In contrast, there are few funds in the sample that are concentrated
in consumer durables, nance, and healthcare. For most industries, hot entrants on
average perform worse than cold entrants. For example, seven out of the ten industry
classication show negative dierences in Carhart 4-factor alpha. The dierences are
most signicant for business equipment and services, nance, consumer non-durables,
and wholesale and retail. One reason for the dierences in signicance across industries
could be the number of observations in the sample. Another reason could be that
investors are more prone to extrapolative beliefs when considering stocks in certain
industries. Overall, the hot entrants underperform cold entrants by 0.23% per month
in terms of 4-factor alpha in the 36 months following entries. Regressions of post-entry
performance on hot industry dummy variable estimate that dierences in performance
are of similar size at around 20 bps per month for various specications. Those results
are reported in Table 1.26.
1.6.2 Funds Investing in High v Low Dividend Yield Stocks
Another interesting aspect of stock characteristics that investors often consider is
dividend payout. Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Baker and Wurgler (2007) argue that
sentimental investors associate dividend-paying stocks with protability and consider
them as safe investments. In contrast, no dividend is associated with traits such as no
earnings and young age, and non-dividend-paying stocks are considered as speculative
opportunities. If investors with these views are prevalent in the market, mutual funds
that invest in high or low dividend yield stocks may be treated as dierent investment
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styles, and the popularity of either of them may be related to the future performance of
entrants to the styles.
As an extension to the main ndings of this study, I explore the relation between
entrant fund performance and style hotness using average dividend yield of stock holdings
as an alternative method to categorize fund styles. In the 19912015 fund sample, I
calculate fund-level dividend yield as the weighted average of 12-month dividend yield
of fund holdings. The stock dividend yield is calculated at monthly frequency as the
dividend payment in the past 12 months divided by the month-end stock price. Funds
with fund-level dividend yield above the cross-sectional median are classied as high
dividend yield style. Otherwise, they are classied as low dividend yield style. Similar
to the main analyses in Section 1.4.1, I consider a style at a particular time to be hot
or cold based on whether the weighted average return of funds in that style category
minus the market return in the past 24 months is above or below the time-series sample
median.
Table 1.27 displays the comparison between the performance of hot and cold
entrant funds using dividend yield style to dene fund style categories. Overall, hot
entrants underperform cold entrants by 8 to 10 basis points per month on average,
depending on the choice of factor-based performance measure. When examining low
and high dividend yield style funds separately, I nd drastic dierences between the
two groups. For low dividend yield style entrants, there are 870 hot entrants and 528
cold entrants. This wide dierence suggests trend-chasing behavior of fund entry in
this style. In contrast, the number of hot and cold entrants among high dividend yield
style funds are almost evenly divided, with 699 funds classied as hot entrants and 704
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classied as cold entrants. in addition, the underperformance of hot style entrants is
found signicant only for low dividend yield styles. On average, hot low dividend yield
entrants underperforms cold entrants by about 20 basis points per month. For high
dividend yield entrants, the performance dierences between hot and cold entrants seem
to be small and insignicant. The results can be related to the previous ndings that hot
entrant underperformance in more prominent for funds with growth- and small-stock-
oriented styles. It also suggests that there might be certain level of segmentation of
clienteles for funds with dierent styles, and investors in low dividend yield style funds,
as well as growth- and small-stock-oriented funds are more prone to extrapolative biases
when assessing style performance.
1.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I study the implications of mutual fund entry decision on perfor-
mance of new funds. For U.S. active equity funds opened during 19912015, I nd that
the post-entry fund performance is worse for entrants that adopt investment styles that
have recently performed well. Entrant funds also underperform incumbent funds in the
same style categories more when past style performance is higher. These ndings are
consistent with investors categorizing funds by investment styles and forming extrapola-
tive beliefs on style performance, which leads to changing distributions of skills of fund




Table 1.1: Number of Entrant and Incumbent Funds by Year
Year #Incumbet #Entrant #Entrant Small Mid Large
in Sample Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value
1980 298
1981 309
1982 317 6 4 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
1983 311 23 16 7 6 0 0 1 2 0 0 0
1984 346 16 13 6 1 0 2 2 1 0 0 1
1985 366 34 24 8 4 3 2 1 3 0 1 2
1986 409 38 19 2 3 3 1 2 2 0 0 6
1987 463 34 20 7 0 0 1 4 0 0 1 7
1988 508 10 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1989 563 20 11 1 2 1 0 2 0 0 3 2
1990 609 31 16 2 3 0 0 3 1 3 2 2
1991 708 50 43 12 5 6 2 5 3 2 5 3
1992 778 132 87 14 13 6 12 6 4 4 11 17
1993 965 154 110 35 7 8 10 12 7 3 13 15
1994 1,156 154 116 31 8 10 9 12 8 7 10 21
1995 1,341 142 104 29 6 14 11 3 10 2 15 14
1996 1,412 187 139 37 10 13 15 24 7 2 14 17
1997 1,595 148 116 23 11 15 5 11 9 5 20 17
1998 1,710 184 179 33 16 22 19 16 15 9 25 24
1999 1,866 181 169 32 14 8 23 22 14 8 30 18
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(continued)
Year #Incumbet #Entrant #Entrant Small Mid Large
in Sample Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value
2000 2,034 228 218 43 13 18 37 21 23 13 32 18
2001 2,202 164 143 19 13 20 10 15 23 11 21 11
2002 2,328 111 102 14 14 18 8 7 13 2 13 13
2003 2,383 119 112 14 10 19 16 6 16 4 14 13
2004 2,390 107 98 22 8 14 12 12 9 3 7 11
2005 2,407 175 159 35 16 16 19 9 23 1 13 27
2006 2,352 134 126 25 16 16 16 11 10 1 12 19
2007 2,480 136 114 21 10 8 18 15 10 5 8 19
2008 2,680 73 60 17 7 3 13 3 5 1 4 7
2009 2,627 68 63 11 4 4 5 7 5 8 8 11
2010 2,950 105 86 22 12 6 9 12 2 7 4 12
2011 2,920 102 94 9 13 16 8 8 8 6 11 15
2012 2,863 104 99 15 10 1 16 13 9 3 11 21
2013 2,833 109 107 30 16 9 14 13 11 1 5 8
2014 2,761 90 82 21 17 5 9 9 8 0 4 9







Table 1.2: Comparing Post-Entry Performance of Hot and Cold Style Entrant Funds
An investment style is considered as in hot status if the TNA-weighted average returns of funds in the
style category minus the value-weighted CRSP index return in the previous 24 months is above the time-
series median of the entire sample. An entrant fund is considered as a hot style entrant fund if its initial
holding-based style at the time of its entry is in hot status. Post-entry performance is measured over the
36-month window after the month of the funds' inception date. If the fund is closed within the 36 months,
it is still included in the calculation. Return in excess of MKT is measured as the average fund monthly
return over the value-weighted CRSP index return. t-statistics of two sample mean tests are reported for
the dierence between average performance of hot and cold style entrant funds. The sample period is
19912015.
Small Mid Large
All Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value
Panel A: Number of Entrants
Hot 1,463 354 152 166 159 141 150 57 108 176
Cold 1,338 218 138 113 164 140 111 54 206 194
Total 2,801 572 290 279 323 281 261 111 314 370
Panel B: Return in Excess of MKT
Hot -0.035 0.025 0.096 0.119 -0.129 -0.103 0.045 -0.292 -0.201 -0.157
Cold 0.002 0.288 0.048 -0.005 -0.050 0.064 0.036 -0.094 -0.151 -0.177
Dierence -0.037 -0.264 0.048 0.124 -0.079 -0.020 0.010 -0.198 -0.050 0.020




All Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value
Panel C: CAPM Alpha
Hot -0.043 -0.012 0.024 0.038 -0.145 -0.073 0.052 -0.233 -0.127 -0.090
Cold 0.038 0.330 0.037 0.069 -0.019 0.108 0.044 -0.099 -0.097 -0.134
Dierence -0.080 -0.342 -0.013 -0.031 -0.125 -0.181 0.008 -0.134 -0.030 0.044
t-stat -3.363 -4.679 -0.159 -0.324 -2.110 -2.648 0.123 -1.743 -0.636 1.116
Panel D: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.048 0.054 -0.043 -0.056 -0.081 -0.114 -0.082 -0.127 -0.057 -0.107
Cold 0.007 0.277 -0.006 -0.061 -0.021 0.093 -0.038 -0.040 -0.076 -0.157
Dierence -0.055 -0.223 -0.037 0.005 -0.061 -0.207 -0.044 -0.087 0.020 0.050
t-stat -2.638 -3.305 -0.569 0.075 -1.016 -3.498 -0.798 -1.305 0.458 1.411
Panel E: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.060 0.002 -0.048 -0.046 -0.092 -0.113 -0.074 -0.109 -0.070 -0.101
Cold 0.001 0.211 -0.007 -0.014 -0.045 0.058 0.015 -0.075 -0.082 -0.123
Dierence -0.061 -0.209 -0.041 -0.032 -0.046 -0.171 -0.089 -0.035 0.012 0.022
t-stat -3.118 -3.360 -0.654 -0.479 -0.856 -3.083 -1.743 -0.530 0.293 0.738
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Table 1.3: Regressions of Post-Entry Fund Performance on Hot Style Dummy
Variable
This table reports results of regressions of fund performance in the m months immedi-
ately following its entry on a dummy variable that equals one if the entrant fund belongs
to a hot style category at the time of entry. The dependent variables are measured by
return in excess of the value-weighted CRSP index return, the CAPM alpha, the Fama-
French 3-factor alpha, and the Carhart 4-factor alpha. Each fund entry during the period
of 19912015 contributes to one observation in the regressions reported here. Fund style
xed eects are included in all specications. The t-statistics reported are calculated
using standard errors clustered at style-year level.
m Coef. t-stat N Adj. Rsq.
Panel A: Return in Excess of MKT
12 -0.058 -0.53 2,801 0.020
24 -0.047 -0.58 2,801 0.022
36 -0.071 -1.13 2,801 0.029
60 -0.107 -2.34 2,801 0.042
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
12 -0.103 -0.96 2,801 0.016
24 -0.097 -1.18 2,801 0.019
36 -0.108 -1.70 2,801 0.024
60 -0.143 -3.08 2,801 0.038
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
12 -0.109 -1.53 2,801 0.014
24 -0.069 -1.34 2,801 0.024
36 -0.075 -1.88 2,801 0.026
60 -0.041 -1.50 2,801 0.016
Panel D: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
12 -0.109 -1.56 2,801 0.016
24 -0.075 -1.51 2,801 0.021
36 -0.078 -2.18 2,801 0.018
60 -0.045 -1.89 2,801 0.008
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Table 1.4: Regressions of Post-Entry Fund Performance on Past Style Per-
formance
This table reports results of regressions of fund performance in the m months immedi-
ately following its entry on past style performance. The dependent variables are mea-
sured by return in excess of the value-weighted CRSP index return, the CAPM alpha,
the Fama-French 3-factor alpha, and the Carhart 4-factor alpha. Past style performance
is measured by the value-weighted average return of all incumbent funds in the same
style category in excess of the value-weighted CRSP index return in the past 24 months.
Each fund entry during the period of 19912015 contributes to one observation in the
regressions reported here. Fund style xed eects are included in all specications. The
t-statistics reported are calculated with standard errors clustered at style-year level.
m Coef. t-stat N Adj. Rsq.
Panel A: Return in Excess of MKT
12 -0.170 -0.86 2,801 0.023
24 -0.216 -1.35 2,801 0.033
36 -0.202 -1.55 2,801 0.042
60 -0.204 -2.28 2,801 0.058
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
12 -0.205 -1.05 2,801 0.020
24 -0.263 -1.69 2,801 0.035
36 -0.246 -1.87 2,801 0.044
60 -0.254 -2.87 2,801 0.062
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
12 -0.304 -2.84 2,801 0.028
24 -0.260 -3.44 2,801 0.049
36 -0.209 -3.33 2,801 0.047
60 -0.108 -2.64 2,801 0.024
Panel D: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
12 -0.283 -2.73 2,801 0.027
24 -0.262 -3.56 2,801 0.047
36 -0.199 -3.56 2,801 0.038
60 -0.105 -3.02 2,801 0.016
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Table 1.5: Comparison of Returns on Buy-and-Hold Portfolios of Hot and
Cold Style Entrant Funds
This table reports results of time-series regressions of monthly returns of buy-and-hold
portfolios of entrant funds on Carhart 4-factors. For the sample period between 1991
and 2018, each entrant fund is added to the hot or non-hot fund portfolio and held
for 5 years. Equally weighted portfolios are rebalanced at the end of every year. For
individual portfolios, the following time-series regression is estimated:
Rp,t −Rf,t = a+ b ·RMRFt + h ·HMLt + s · SMBt + u · UMDt + et.
To estimate the dierence in performance between hot and non-hot portfolios, the dif-
ference in returns of the two portfolios is used as the dependent variable. t-statistics of
coecient estimates are in parentheses. Each regression uses 336 monthly observations.
Coecient Estimates
a b h s u Adj. Rsq.
Panel A: Equally Weighted Portfolio Returns
Hot -0.10 1.00 -0.01 0.27 0.01 0.98
(-2.75) (110.02) (-0.89) (23.16) (0.68)
Cold -0.05 0.95 0.05 0.20 0.01 0.98
(-1.59) (122.20) (4.39) (20.47) (1.47)
Dierence -0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.07 0.00 0.36
(-1.63) (6.46) (-5.47) (6.65) (-0.68)
Panel B: Value Weighted Portfolio Returns
Hot -0.18 1.01 -0.05 0.25 0.03 0.97
(-3.72) (84.47) (-2.80) (16.56) (2.81)
Cold -0.07 0.98 -0.03 0.15 0.03 0.98
(-2.06) (111.53) (-2.22) (13.70) (4.20)
Dierence -0.11 0.03 -0.02 0.10 0.00 0.15
(-2.12) (2.18) (-1.12) (6.22) (-0.28)
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Table 1.6: Regressions of Post-Entry Fund Performance Relative to Peers on
Hot Style Dummy Variable
This table reports results of regressions of fund performance relative to peers in the
m months immediately following its entry on a dummy variable that equals one if the
entrant fund belongs to a hot style category at the time of entry. The dependent vari-
ables are measured by dierences in return in excess of the value-weighted CRSP index
return, the CAPM alpha, the Fama-French 3-factor alpha, and the Carhart 4-factor al-
pha between the entrant fund and the value-weighted average of incumbent funds in the
same style category. Each fund entry during the period of 19912015 contributes to one
observation in the regressions reported here. Fund style xed eects are included in all
specications. The t-statistics reported are calculated using standard errors clustered at
style-year level.
m Coef. t-stat N Adj. Rsq.
Panel A: Return in Excess of MKT
12 -0.108 -1.74 2,801 0.014
24 -0.088 -1.94 2,801 0.017
36 -0.086 -2.17 2,801 0.021
60 -0.046 -1.46 2,801 0.023
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
12 -0.087 -1.53 2,801 0.020
24 -0.091 -2.08 2,801 0.027
36 -0.091 -2.37 2,801 0.031
60 -0.062 -2.03 2,801 0.029
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
12 -0.131 -2.20 2,801 0.019
24 -0.099 -2.27 2,801 0.026
36 -0.112 -3.08 2,801 0.030
60 -0.073 -2.56 2,801 0.026
Panel D: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
12 -0.116 -2.01 2,801 0.021
24 -0.106 -2.43 2,801 0.029
36 -0.104 -2.94 2,801 0.032
60 -0.077 -2.73 2,801 0.025
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Table 1.7: Regressions of Post-Entry Fund Performance Relative to Peers on
Past Style Performance
This table reports results of regressions of fund performance relative to peers in the
m months immediately following its entry on past style performance. The dependent
variables are measured by dierences in return in excess of the value-weighted CRSP
index return, the CAPM alpha, the Fama-French 3-factor alpha, and the Carhart 4-
factor alpha between the entrant fund and the value-weighted average of incumbent
funds in the same style category. Past style performance is measured by the value-
weighted average return of all incumbent funds in the same style category in excess of
the value-weighted CRSP index return in the past 24 months. Each fund entry during
the period of 19912015 contributes to one observation in the regressions reported here.
Fund style xed eects are included in all specications. The t-statistics reported are
calculated using standard errors clustered at style-year level.
m Coef. t-stat N Adj. Rsq.
Panel A: Return in Excess of MKT
12 -0.156 -1.69 2,801 0.015
24 -0.164 -2.56 2,801 0.022
36 -0.146 -2.20 2,801 0.026
60 -0.096 -1.93 2,801 0.028
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
12 -0.122 -1.41 2,801 0.021
24 -0.169 -2.80 2,801 0.033
36 -0.153 -2.48 2,801 0.038
60 -0.117 -2.54 2,801 0.036
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
12 -0.217 -2.44 2,801 0.024
24 -0.212 -3.84 2,801 0.040
36 -0.203 -4.02 2,801 0.044
60 -0.143 -3.71 2,801 0.038
Panel D: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
12 -0.191 -2.15 2,801 0.024
24 -0.230 -3.92 2,801 0.046
36 -0.198 -3.88 2,801 0.047
60 -0.147 -3.78 2,801 0.038
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Table 1.8: Length of Fund Incubation Period (19962006)
This table reports the distribution of the number of months between fund inception date
and fund ticker creation date for entrant funds in the sample period 19962006. Fund
inception date is the earliest rst_oer_dt in the CRSP database for all fund share
classes of a fund. Fund ticker creation date is the earliest date any of the share classes
of a fund created a ticker symbol with NASD.
N ≤ 1 (1, 12] (12, 24] > 24
1,293 669 396 147 81
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Table 1.9: Comparing Post-Entry Performance of Hot and Cold Style Entrant Funds (1996
2006)
This table compares post-entry performance of hot and cold style entrant funds for the period of 19962006.
Fund entry dates are determined using the fund inception dates. Post-entry performance is measured over
the 36-month window following the fund entry date.
Small Mid Large
All Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value
Panel A: Number of Entrants
Hot 617 139 68 88 60 51 84 21 51 55
Cold 676 114 46 57 92 81 46 30 115 95
Total 1,293 253 114 145 152 132 130 51 166 150
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
Hot 0.035 0.079 0.217 0.184 -0.138 -0.033 0.115 -0.360 -0.150 -0.090
Cold 0.185 0.708 0.427 0.214 0.114 0.271 0.190 -0.142 -0.109 -0.127
Dierence -0.150 -0.628 -0.210 -0.030 -0.253 -0.304 -0.075 -0.218 -0.041 0.037
t-stat -3.644 -5.062 -1.470 -0.202 -2.627 -2.675 -0.759 -1.792 -0.521 0.449
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.057 -0.028 -0.015 -0.033 -0.088 -0.129 -0.073 -0.187 -0.008 -0.088
Cold 0.102 0.541 0.183 -0.074 0.075 0.219 0.045 -0.073 -0.061 -0.149
Dierence -0.159 -0.569 -0.198 0.041 -0.163 -0.348 -0.118 -0.115 0.053 0.060
t-stat -4.444 -4.998 -1.645 0.406 -1.583 -3.267 -1.366 -1.085 0.753 0.780
Panel D: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.054 -0.044 -0.019 -0.032 -0.071 -0.128 -0.053 -0.170 -0.017 -0.065
Cold 0.093 0.456 0.211 0.002 0.029 0.163 0.114 -0.070 -0.066 -0.112
Dierence -0.147 -0.500 -0.230 -0.034 -0.100 -0.291 -0.167 -0.100 0.048 0.046
t-stat -4.508 -4.831 -2.027 -0.332 -1.085 -2.968 -2.116 -1.084 0.737 0.774
44
Table 1.10: Robustness to Fund Incubation: Comparing Post-Entry Performance of Hot and
Cold Style Entrant Funds (19962006)
This table compares post-entry performance of hot and cold style entrant funds for the period of 1996
2006. Fund entry dates are determined using the fund ticker creation dates, which exclude fund incubation
periods. Post-entry performance is measured over the 36-month window following the fund entry date.
Small Mid Large
All Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value
Panel A: Number of Entrants
Hot 690 163 79 98 60 57 98 19 54 62
Cold 603 90 35 47 92 75 32 32 112 88
Total 1,293 253 114 145 152 132 130 49 157 150
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
Hot 0.028 0.045 0.264 0.136 -0.077 -0.014 0.109 -0.371 -0.196 -0.164
Cold 0.141 0.713 0.638 0.313 0.149 0.158 -0.058 -0.289 -0.155 -0.154
Dierence -0.113 -0.668 -0.374 -0.177 -0.226 -0.172 0.167 -0.082 -0.042 -0.010
t-stat -2.795 -5.273 -2.536 -1.166 -2.411 -1.532 1.517 -0.617 -0.624 -0.136
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.094 -0.091 -0.016 -0.085 -0.068 -0.186 -0.098 -0.203 -0.037 -0.160
Cold 0.035 0.356 0.284 -0.084 0.072 0.149 -0.091 -0.200 -0.092 -0.170
Dierence -0.129 -0.447 -0.300 -0.001 -0.140 -0.334 -0.007 -0.003 0.055 0.010
t-stat -3.999 -4.218 -2.612 -0.010 -1.538 -3.196 -0.086 -0.026 0.977 0.165
Panel D: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.092 -0.106 -0.033 -0.088 -0.054 -0.176 -0.084 -0.169 -0.023 -0.140
Cold 0.032 0.316 0.297 -0.008 0.009 0.090 0.029 -0.200 -0.094 -0.125
Dierence -0.123 -0.422 -0.330 -0.080 -0.064 -0.265 -0.113 0.031 0.071 -0.015
t-stat -4.139 -4.279 -3.104 -0.822 -0.775 -2.958 -1.358 0.255 1.314 -0.264
45
Table 1.11: Robustness to Fund Incubation: Regressions of Post-Entry Fund Performance
on Hot Style Dummy Variable (19962006)
This table compares results of regressions of fund performance on hot style dummy variable for alternative
denitions of fund entry date. The left panel reports results using fund inception date as fund entry date,
and the right panel uses fund ticker creation date and excludes fund incubation period. The dependent
variables are fund performance in the m months following fund entry measured by the CAPM alpha,
the Fama-French 3-factor alpha, and the Carhart 4-factor alpha. The independent variable is a dummy
variable that equals to one if the entrant fund is a hot style entrant. Each fund entry during the period
of 19962006 contributes to one observation in each regression. Fund style xed eects are included in all
specications. The t-statistics reported are calculated using standard errors clustered at style-year level.
Baseline Excluding Fund Incubation Returns
m Coef. t N Adj. Rsq. Coef. t N Adj. Rsq.
Panel A: CAPM Alpha
12 -0.235 -1.29 1,293 0.031 -0.242 -1.89 1,293 0.029
24 -0.207 -1.58 1,293 0.039 -0.190 -1.92 1,293 0.043
36 -0.230 -2.63 1,293 0.080 -0.226 -3.01 1,293 0.088
60 -0.245 -4.83 1,293 0.168 -0.214 -4.47 1,293 0.138
Panel B: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
12 -0.255 -2.12 1,293 0.018 -0.239 -2.59 1,293 0.010
24 -0.191 -2.46 1,293 0.036 -0.177 -2.51 1,293 0.028
36 -0.188 -3.34 1,293 0.046 -0.161 -3.05 1,293 0.033
60 -0.107 -2.66 1,293 0.030 -0.075 -2.15 1,293 0.015
Panel C: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
12 -0.233 -2.05 1,293 0.023 -0.196 -2.23 1,293 0.010
24 -0.195 -2.61 1,293 0.038 -0.167 -2.52 1,293 0.026
36 -0.179 -3.51 1,293 0.040 -0.159 -3.31 1,293 0.029
60 -0.105 -2.96 1,293 0.023 -0.071 -2.36 1,293 0.010
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Table 1.12: Robustness to Excluding Fund Returns in the First Year: Comparing Post-Entry
Performance of Hot and Cold Style Entrant Funds
An investment style is considered as in hot status if the TNA-weighted average returns of funds in the
style category minus the value-weighted CRSP index return in the previous 24 months is above the time-
series median of the entire sample. An entrant fund is considered as a hot style entrant fund if its initial
holding-based style at the time of its entry is in hot status. Post-entry performance is measured over the
36-month window starting from one year after funds' inception date. If the fund is closed within the 36
months, it is still included in the calculation. Return in excess of MKT is measured as the average fund
monthly return over the value-weighted CRSP index return. t-statistics of two sample mean tests are
reported for the dierence between average performance of hot and cold style entrant funds. The sample
period is 19912015.
Small Mid Large
All Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value
Panel A: Number of Entrants
Hot 1,463 354 152 166 159 141 150 57 108 176
Cold 1,338 218 138 113 164 140 111 54 206 194
Total 2,801 572 290 279 323 281 261 111 314 370
Panel B: Return in Excess of MKT
Hot -0.042 0.011 0.075 0.115 -0.126 -0.106 0.048 -0.309 -0.209 -0.163
Cold -0.002 0.252 0.090 -0.016 -0.052 0.059 0.035 -0.096 -0.146 -0.191
Dierence -0.040 -0.241 -0.015 0.131 -0.073 -0.164 0.012 -0.213 -0.063 0.028




All Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value
Panel C: CAPM Alpha
Hot -0.055 -0.032 0.006 0.028 -0.150 -0.078 0.049 -0.259 -0.142 -0.093
Cold 0.034 0.302 0.077 0.056 -0.020 0.097 0.057 -0.100 -0.094 -0.147
Dierence -0.089 -0.334 -0.071 -0.028 -0.130 -0.176 -0.008 -0.159 -0.048 0.054
t-stat -3.742 -4.640 -0.902 -0.295 -2.171 -2.533 -0.127 -2.072 -1.012 1.386
Panel D: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.060 0.026 -0.051 -0.050 -0.093 -0.120 -0.089 -0.149 -0.072 -0.113
Cold 0.001 0.244 0.008 -0.065 -0.013 0.077 -0.039 -0.047 -0.074 -0.164
Dierence -0.061 -0.218 -0.059 0.015 -0.080 -0.198 -0.050 -0.102 0.002 0.050
t-stat -2.970 -3.301 -0.911 0.223 -1.353 -3.335 -0.879 -1.445 0.055 1.478
Panel E: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.074 -0.027 -0.058 -0.047 -0.104 -0.120 -0.085 -0.139 -0.084 -0.105
Cold -0.003 0.192 0.005 -0.015 -0.043 0.043 0.015 -0.083 -0.079 -0.127
Dierence -0.071 -0.219 -0.062 -0.032 -0.061 -0.163 -0.100 -0.056 -0.005 0.022
t-stat -3.686 -3.584 -1.011 -0.479 -1.141 -2.971 -1.911 -0.804 -0.138 0.734
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Table 1.13: Robustness to Excluding Fund Returns in the First Year: Re-
gressions of Post-Entry Fund Performance on Hot Style Dummy Variable
This table reports results of regressions of fund performance in the m months starting
from one year after its entry on a dummy variable that equals one if the entrant fund
belongs to a hot style category at the time of entry. The dependent variables are mea-
sured by dierences in return in excess of the value-weighted CRSP index return, the
CAPM alpha, the Fama-French 3-factor alpha, and the Carhart 4-factor alpha between
the entrant fund and the value-weighted average of incumbent funds in the same style
category. Each fund entry during the period of 19912015 contributes to one observa-
tion in each regression. Fund style xed eects are included in all specications. The
t-statistics reported are calculated using standard errors clustered at style-year level.
m Coef. t-stat N Adj. Rsq.
Panel A: Return in Excess of MKT
12 -0.035 -0.35 2,801 0.017
24 -0.041 -0.52 2,801 0.021
36 -0.072 -1.15 2,801 0.028
60 -0.108 -2.41 2,801 0.043
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
12 -0.115 -1.14 2,801 0.015
24 -0.097 -1.23 2,801 0.017
36 -0.115 -1.83 2,801 0.024
60 -0.147 -3.20 2,801 0.040
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
12 -0.104 -1.59 2,801 0.011
24 -0.080 -1.62 2,801 0.022
36 -0.080 -2.01 2,801 0.023
60 -0.043 -1.59 2,801 0.014
Panel D: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
12 -0.117 -1.75 2,801 0.014
24 -0.087 -1.81 2,801 0.019
36 -0.087 -2.42 2,801 0.016
60 -0.048 -2.02 2,801 0.007
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Table 1.14: Robustness to Look-Ahead Bias: Comparing Post-Entry Performance of Hot and
Cold Style Entrant Funds
An investment style is considered as in hot status if the TNA-weighted average returns of funds in the style
category minus the value-weighted CRSP index return in the previous 24 months is above the cumulative
median for the sample up to the time of the observation. An entrant fund is considered as a hot style
entrant fund if its initial holding-based style at the time of its entry is in hot status. Post-entry performance
is measured over the 36-month window starting the month end of funds' inception date. If the fund is
closed within the 36 months, it is still included in the calculation. Return in excess of MKT is measured
as the average fund monthly return over the value-weighted CRSP index return. t-statistics of two sample
mean tests are reported for the dierence between average performance of hot and cold style entrant funds.
The sample period is 19912015.
Small Mid Large
All Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value
Panel A: Number of Entrants
Hot 1,414 376 149 159 133 132 143 63 130 129
Cold 1,387 196 141 120 190 149 118 48 184 241
Total 2,801 572 290 279 323 281 261 111 314 370
Panel B: Return in Excess of MKT
Hot -0.023 0.024 0.112 0.152 -0.139 -0.083 0.063 -0.264 -0.185 -0.167
Cold -0.011 0.319 0.032 -0.042 -0.054 0.035 0.015 -0.106 -0.157 -0.168
Dierence -0.012 -0.295 0.080 0.195 -0.085 -0.118 0.048 -0.159 -0.028 0.000




All Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value
Panel C: CAPM Alpha
Hot -0.027 -0.002 0.045 0.071 -0.131 -0.056 0.070 -0.199 -0.117 -0.097
Cold 0.018 0.349 0.014 0.023 -0.046 0.082 0.023 -0.126 -0.100 -0.122
Dierence -0.045 -0.351 0.031 0.048 -0.084 -0.138 0.048 -0.073 -0.017 0.024
t-stat -1.882 -4.687 0.393 0.502 -1.392 -1.994 0.750 -0.937 -0.379 0.591
Panel D: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.063 -0.049 -0.044 -0.061 -0.107 -0.111 -0.083 -0.111 -0.056 -0.118
Cold 0.011 0.006 -0.007 -0.053 -0.011 0.078 -0.039 -0.051 -0.079 -0.142
Dierence -0.074 -0.055 -0.037 -0.008 -0.096 -0.189 -0.044 -0.061 0.023 0.024
t-stat -3.526 -2.621 -0.568 -0.122 -1.590 -3.181 -0.815 -0.899 0.567 0.645
Panel E: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.060 -0.004 -0.047 -0.055 -0.103 -0.113 -0.075 -0.096 -0.063 -0.110
Cold -0.001 0.246 -0.010 -0.005 -0.044 0.048 0.012 -0.088 -0.088 -0.114
Dierence -0.059 -0.249 -0.037 -0.049 -0.058 -0.161 -0.086 -0.007 0.025 0.004
t-stat -3.031 -3.936 -0.590 -0.743 -1.065 -2.893 -1.712 -0.112 0.643 0.134
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Table 1.15: Robustness to Look-Ahead Bias: Regressions of Post-Entry Fund
Performance on Hot Style Dummy Variable
This table reports results of regressions of fund performance in the m months following
its entry on a dummy variable that equals one if the entrant fund belongs to a hot style
category at the time of entry. The dependent variables are measured by dierences in
return in excess of the value-weighted CRSP index return, the CAPM alpha, the Fama-
French 3-factor alpha, and the Carhart 4-factor alpha between the entrant fund and
the value-weighted average of incumbent funds in the same style category. Each fund
entry during the period of 19912015 contributes to one observation in each regression.
Fund style xed eects are included in all specications. The t-statistics reported are
calculated using standard errors clustered at style-year level.
m Coef. t-stat N Adj. Rsq.
Panel A: Return in Excess of MKT
12 -0.018 -0.15 2,801 0.019
24 -0.018 -0.21 2,801 0.022
36 -0.055 -0.84 2,801 0.028
60 -0.097 -2.00 2,801 0.040
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
12 -0.046 -0.41 2,801 0.014
24 -0.063 -0.73 2,801 0.017
36 -0.081 -1.20 2,801 0.021
60 -0.124 -2.54 2,801 0.033
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
12 -0.120 -1.61 2,801 0.015
24 -0.088 -1.66 2,801 0.026
36 -0.089 -2.11 2,801 0.028
60 -0.058 -1.99 2,801 0.018
Panel D: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
12 -0.097 -1.35 2,801 0.015
24 -0.088 -1.71 2,801 0.022
36 -0.086 -2.31 2,801 0.019
60 -0.056 -2.23 2,801 0.009
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Table 1.16: Measuring Style Performance Using CAPM Alpha: Comparing Post-Entry Per-
formance of Hot and Cold Style Entrant Funds
An investment style is considered as in hot status if the CAPM alpha of TNA-weighted average returns
of funds in the style category in the previous 24 months is above the time-series median for the entire
sample. An entrant fund is considered as a hot style entrant fund if its initial holding-based style at the
time of its entry is in hot status. Post-entry performance is measured over the 36-month window starting
the month end of funds' inception date. If the fund is closed within the 36 months, it is still included
in the calculation. Return in excess of MKT is measured as the average fund monthly return over the
value-weighted CRSP index return. t-statistics of two sample mean tests are reported for the dierence
between average performance of hot and cold style entrant funds. The sample period is 19912015.
Small Mid Large
All Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value
Panel A: Number of Entrants
Hot 1,464 340 140 180 155 135 154 55 121 184
Cold 1,337 232 150 99 168 146 107 56 193 186
Total 2,801 572 290 279 323 281 261 111 314 370
Panel B: Return in Excess of MKT
Hot -0.050 0.048 0.114 0.091 -0.169 -0.101 -0.024 -0.267 -0.207 -0.211
Cold 0.019 0.237 0.035 0.028 -0.016 0.054 0.135 -0.126 -0.144 -0.125
Dierence -0.069 -0.189 0.079 0.062 -0.153 -0.155 -0.160 -0.141 -0.063 -0.087




All Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value
Panel C: CAPM Alpha
Hot -0.045 0.019 0.038 0.033 -0.148 -0.062 -0.004 -0.206 -0.127 -0.133
Cold 0.040 0.263 0.022 0.082 -0.020 0.091 0.124 -0.129 -0.095 -0.093
Dierence -0.084 -0.244 0.016 -0.049 -0.128 -0.153 -0.128 -0.077 -0.032 -0.040
t-stat -3.518 -3.347 0.203 -0.500 -2.148 -2.229 -2.001 -0.995 -0.708 -1.009
Panel D: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.068 0.033 -0.048 -0.075 -0.111 -0.123 -0.119 -0.107 -0.063 -0.139
Cold 0.029 0.294 -0.005 -0.027 0.005 0.092 0.017 -0.064 -0.074 -0.127
Dierence -0.098 -0.260 -0.044 -0.048 -0.116 -0.215 -0.136 -0.043 0.011 -0.012
t-stat -4.677 -3.916 -0.669 -0.706 -1.947 -3.636 -2.494 -0.644 0.270 -0.329
Panel E: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.069 -0.013 -0.048 -0.050 -0.114 -0.116 -0.096 -0.094 -0.066 -0.109
Cold 0.011 0.221 -0.011 -0.003 -0.026 0.054 0.050 -0.091 -0.085 -0.115
Dierence -0.081 -0.234 -0.036 -0.047 -0.089 -0.170 -0.146 -0.003 0.019 0.006
t-stat -4.171 -3.823 -0.578 -0.678 -1.646 -3.064 -2.879 -0.045 0.477 0.189
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Table 1.17: Measuring Style Performance Using CAPM Alpha: Regressions
of Post-Entry Fund Performance on Hot Style Dummy Variable
This table reports results of regressions of fund performance in the m months following
its entry on on a dummy variable that equals one if the entrant fund belongs to a hot
style category at the time of entry. The dependent variables are measured by dierences
in return in excess of the value-weighted CRSP index return, the CAPM alpha, the
Fama-French 3-factor alpha, and the Carhart 4-factor alpha between the entrant fund
and the value-weighted average of incumbent funds in the same style category. Each fund
entry during the period of 19912015 contributes to one observation in each regression.
Fund style xed eects are included in all specications. The t-statistics reported are
calculated using standard errors clustered at style-year level.
m Coef. t-stat N Adj. Rsq.
Panel A: Return in Excess of MKT
12 -0.123 -1.19 2,801 0.022
24 -0.099 -1.28 2,801 0.025
36 -0.097 -1.63 2,801 0.031
60 -0.111 -2.52 2,801 0.043
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
12 -0.146 -1.44 2,801 0.018
24 -0.131 -1.67 2,801 0.022
36 -0.107 -1.78 2,801 0.024
60 -0.130 -2.97 2,801 0.035
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
12 -0.169 -2.39 2,801 0.019
24 -0.124 -2.59 2,801 0.031
36 -0.112 -2.95 2,801 0.032
60 -0.078 -2.90 2,801 0.021
Panel D: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
12 -0.140 -2.04 2,801 0.018
24 -0.112 -2.36 2,801 0.025
36 -0.094 -2.76 2,801 0.020
60 -0.064 -2.74 2,801 0.011
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Table 1.18: Measuring Style Performance Using CAPM Alpha: Regressions
of Post-Entry Fund Performance on Past Style Performance
This table reports results of regressions of fund performance in themmonths following its
entry on past style performance. The dependent variables are measured by dierences
in return in excess of the value-weighted CRSP index return, the CAPM alpha, the
Fama-French 3-factor alpha, and the Carhart 4-factor alpha between the entrant fund
and the value-weighted average of incumbent funds in the same style category. The
independent variable is Carhart 4-Factor alpha of value-weighted average returns of
funds of the same style in the past 24 months. Each fund entry during the period of
19912015 contributes to one observation in each regression. Fund style xed eects
are included in all specications. The t-statistics reported are calculated using standard
errors clustered at style-year level.
m Coef. t-stat N Adj. Rsq.
Panel A: Return in Excess of MKT
12 -0.229 -1.10 2,801 0.025
24 -0.255 -1.54 2,801 0.036
36 -0.244 -1.83 2,801 0.046
60 -0.225 -2.42 2,801 0.060
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
12 -0.249 -1.19 2,801 0.022
24 -0.285 -1.71 2,801 0.036
36 -0.271 -1.99 2,801 0.046
60 -0.261 -2.81 2,801 0.060
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
12 -0.347 -3.00 2,801 0.031
24 -0.314 -4.19 2,801 0.058
36 -0.259 -4.21 2,801 0.056
60 -0.145 -3.54 2,801 0.031
Panel D: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
12 -0.322 -2.85 2,801 0.030
24 -0.302 -4.10 2,801 0.053
36 -0.231 -4.13 2,801 0.044
60 -0.125 -3.53 2,801 0.019
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Table 1.19: Robustness: Comparing Post-Entry Performance of Hot and Cold Style Entrant
Funds, Dependent Sort on Size and Book-to-Market Styles
An investment style is considered as in hot status if the TNA-weighted average returns of funds in the
style category minus the value-weighted CRSP index return in the previous 24 months is above the time-
series median of the entire sample. An entrant fund is considered as a hot style entrant fund if its initial
holding-based style at the time of its entry is in hot status. Post-entry performance is measured over the
36-month window after the month of the funds' inception date. If the fund is closed within the 36 months,
it is still included in the calculation. Return in excess of MKT is measured as the average fund monthly
return over the value-weighted CRSP index return. t-statistics of two sample mean tests are reported for
the dierence between average performance of hot and cold style entrant funds. The sample period is
19912015.
Small Mid Large
All Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value
Panel A: Number of Entrants
Hot 1,512 238 220 220 156 138 181 129 101 129
Cold 1,289 148 142 173 154 126 110 136 166 134
Total 2,801 386 362 393 310 264 291 265 267 263
Panel B: Return in Excess of MKT
Hot -0.023 0.048 0.106 0.086 -0.164 -0.076 0.072 -0.211 -0.184 -0.155
Cold -0.010 0.226 0.191 -0.012 0.018 -0.004 -0.028 -0.120 -0.192 -0.170
Dierence -0.013 -0.179 -0.085 0.098 -0.182 -0.072 0.100 -0.091 0.009 0.015




All Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value
Panel C: CAPM Alpha
Hot -0.029 0.013 0.057 0.023 -0.168 -0.056 0.079 -0.164 -0.123 -0.093
Cold 0.025 0.259 0.172 0.039 0.023 0.056 0.004 -0.092 -0.106 -0.137
Dierence -0.054 -0.245 -0.116 -0.016 -0.192 -0.112 0.075 -0.072 -0.017 0.044
t-stat -2.262 -2.533 -1.528 -0.206 -3.230 -1.513 1.238 -1.621 -0.358 0.847
Panel D: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.052 0.059 0.005 -0.055 -0.118 -0.105 -0.067 -0.096 -0.099 -0.109
Cold 0.014 0.300 0.096 -0.032 0.049 0.040 -0.031 -0.049 -0.096 -0.160
Dierence -0.065 -0.241 -0.091 -0.023 -0.167 -0.145 -0.036 -0.047 -0.003 0.051
t-stat -3.119 -2.672 -1.417 -0.420 -2.809 -2.232 -0.693 -1.198 -0.075 1.096
Panel E: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.066 -0.003 -0.022 -0.053 -0.126 -0.112 -0.053 -0.102 -0.087 -0.120
Cold 0.010 0.222 0.088 0.003 0.018 -0.002 0.028 -0.066 -0.086 -0.116
Dierence -0.076 -0.225 -0.110 -0.056 -0.144 -0.110 -0.081 -0.036 -0.001 -0.005
t-stat -3.888 -2.711 -1.828 -1.043 -2.667 -1.839 -1.643 -0.924 -0.022 -0.124
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Table 1.20: Robustness: Comparison of Returns on Buy-and-Hold Portfolios
of Hot and Cold Style Entrant Funds, Dependent Sort on Size and Book-to-
Market Styles
This table reports results of time-series regressions of monthly returns of buy-and-hold
portfolios of entrant funds on Carhart 4-factors. For the sample period between 1991
and 2018, each entrant fund is added to the hot or non-hot fund portfolio and held
for 5 years. Equally weighted portfolios are rebalanced at the end of every year. For
individual portfolios, the following time-series regression is estimated:
Rp,t −Rf,t = a+ b ·RMRFt + h ·HMLt + s · SMBt + u · UMDt + et.
To estimate the dierence in performance between hot and non-hot portfolios, the dif-
ference in returns of the two portfolios is used as the dependent variable. t-statistics of
coecient estimates are in parentheses. Each regression uses 336 monthly observations.
Coecient Estimates
a b h s u Adj. Rsq.
Panel A: Equally Weighted Portfolio Returns
Hot -0.08 0.99 -0.01 0.25 0.00 0.98
(-2.25) (106.18) (-0.50) (21.10) (0.16)
Cold -0.06 0.95 0.05 0.20 0.01 0.98
(-1.95) (122.64) (4.99) (20.45) (1.71)
Dierence -0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.28
(-0.72) (5.54) (-5.21) (4.76) (-1.41)
Panel B: Value Weighted Portfolio Returns
Hot -0.16 0.99 -0.04 0.27 0.02 0.97
(-3.59) (89.75) (-2.64) (19.16) (2.15)
Cold -0.07 0.99 -0.02 0.16 0.04 0.98
(-1.99) (112.39) (-1.76) (13.80) (4.92)
Dierence -0.09 0.00 -0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.19
(-1.99) (0.08) (-1.23) (8.11) (-1.77)
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Table 1.21: Comparing Post-Entry Performance of Hot and Cold Style Entrant Funds, One-
Dimensional Style Categories
An investment style is considered as in hot status if the TNA-weighted average returns of funds in the
style category minus the value-weighted CRSP index return in the previous 24 months is above the time-
series median of the entire sample. An entrant fund is considered as a hot style entrant fund if its initial
holding-based style at the time of its entry is in hot status. Post-entry performance is measured over the
36-month window after the month of the funds' inception date. If the fund is closed within the 36 months,
it is still included in the calculation. Return in excess of MKT is measured as the average fund monthly
return over the value-weighted CRSP index return. t-statistics of two sample mean tests are reported for
the dierence between average performance of hot and non-hot entrant funds. Each entrant funds from
1991 to 2015 contribute to one observation for the test.
Book-to-Market Size
All Growth Blend Value Small Mid Large
Panel A: Number of Entrants
Hot 1,463 570 401 492 672 450 341
Cold 1,338 436 484 418 469 415 454
Total 2,801 1,006 885 910 1,141 865 795
Panel B: Return in Excess of MKT
Hot -0.035 -0.050 -0.054 -0.002 0.064 -0.063 -0.194
Cold 0.002 0.113 -0.032 -0.074 0.147 0.011 -0.155
Dierence -0.037 -0.163 -0.022 0.072 -0.083 -0.074 -0.039




All Growth Blend Value Small Mid Large
Panel C: CAPM Alpha
Hot -0.043 -0.071 -0.051 -0.004 0.008 -0.057 -0.126
Non-hot 0.038 0.145 0.000 -0.032 0.181 0.041 -0.113
Dierence -0.080 -0.217 -0.051 0.028 -0.172 -0.097 -0.012
t-stat -3.363 -4.647 -1.356 0.744 -3.602 -2.630 -0.447
Panel D: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.048 -0.002 -0.072 -0.082 0.005 -0.092 -0.095
Non-hot 0.007 0.126 -0.007 -0.099 0.112 0.013 -0.107
Dierence -0.055 -0.128 -0.064 0.017 -0.108 -0.105 0.012
t-stat -2.638 -2.937 -1.998 0.589 -2.606 -3.105 0.476
Panel E: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.060 -0.035 -0.077 -0.074 -0.021 -0.092 -0.092
Non-hot 0.001 0.079 -0.020 -0.057 0.092 0.006 -0.098
Dierence -0.061 -0.114 -0.057 -0.017 -0.114 -0.098 0.006
t-stat -3.118 -2.867 -1.866 -0.627 -2.947 -3.155 0.260
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Table 1.22: Comparing Performance of Equally Weighted Buy-and-Hold
Portfolios of Hot and Cold Style Entrant Funds
This table reports performance of equally weighted buy-and-hold portfolios of entrant
funds. For the sample period between 1991 and 2018, each entrant fund is added to
the hot or non-hot fund portfolio and held for 5 years. Equally weighted portfolios are
rebalanced at the end of every year. For individual portfolios, the following time-series
regression is estimated:
Rp,t −Rf,t = a+ b ·RMRFt + h ·HMLt + s · SMBt + et.
To estimate the dierence in performance between hot and non-hot portfolios, the dif-
ference in returns of the two portfolios is used as the dependent variable. Only the
intercept is included to measure performance using excess returns, the rst two terms
are included for CAPM, and all terms are included for the Fama-French 3-factor model.
t-statistics of coecient estimates are in parentheses. Each regression uses 336 monthly
observations.
Coecient Estimates
a b h s Adj. Rsq.








Hot -0.08 1.04 0.94
(-1.41) (74.60)
Cold -0.02 0.97 0.96
(-0.36) (89.68)
Dierence -0.07 0.07 0.18
(-1.94) (8.51)
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Model
Hot -0.10 0.99 -0.01 0.27 0.98
(-2.67) (114.87) (-1.07) (23.30)
Cold -0.04 0.94 0.04 0.20 0.98
(-1.36) (127.05) (4.16) (20.61)
Dierence -0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.07 0.36
(-1.77) (6.96) (-5.46) (6.62)
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Table 1.23: Comparing Performance of Value Weighted Buy-and-Hold Port-
folios of Hot and Cold Style Entrant Funds
This table reports performance of value weighted buy-and-hold portfolios of entrant
funds. For the sample period between 1991 and 2018, each entrant fund is added to
the hot or non-hot fund portfolio and held for 5 years. For individual portfolios, the
following time-series regression is estimated:
Rp,t −Rf,t = a+ b ·RMRFt + h ·HMLt + s · SMBt + et.
To estimate the dierence in performance between hot and non-hot portfolios, the dif-
ference in returns of the two portfolios is used as the dependent variable. Only the
intercept is included to measure performance using excess returns, the rst two terms
are included for CAPM, and all terms are included for the Fama-French 3-factor model.
t-statistics of coecient estimates are in parentheses. Each regression uses 336 monthly
observations.
Coecient Estimates
a b h s Adj. Rsq.








Hot -0.16 1.05 0.93
(-2.34) (66.16)
Cold -0.05 1.00 0.96
(-1.08) (92.04)
Dierence -0.11 0.05 0.04
(-2.07) (3.82)
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Model
Hot -0.16 1.00 -0.06 0.26 0.96
(-3.27) (86.53) (-3.48) (16.65)
Cold -0.05 0.97 -0.04 0.16 0.98
(-1.35) (112.49) (-3.16) (13.72)
Dierence -0.11 0.03 -0.02 0.10 0.15
(-2.20) (2.36) (-1.09) (6.23)
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Table 1.24: Industry Composition
This table reports the average weight of stocks of the ten industry classication in the
market and the initial portfolios of entrant funds. The sample period is 19912015. All
numbers are in percentage points.
Ten Industry Classications Market Entrant Funds
Unnormalized Normalized
1. Consumer non-durables 7.35 5.98 6.66
2. Consumer durables 4.00 3.77 4.13
3. Healthcare 9.92 8.68 9.56
4. Manufacturing 13.05 14.05 15.52
5. Energy 7.45 5.22 5.87
6. Utilities 4.18 2.80 3.18
7. Telecom 6.08 3.81 4.21
8. Business equipment and services 20.01 20.74 22.73
9. Wholesale and retail 10.37 10.96 12.06
10. Finance 17.61 14.52 16.09
Total 100.00 90.53 100.00
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Table 1.25: Comparing Post-Entry Performance of Hot and Cold Industry Entrant Industry
Concentrated Funds
This table compares post-entry performance of funds that concentrated in hot and cold industries. An
entrant fund is considered as concentrated in an industry if the weight of the industry in its initial portfolio
holdings is more than three times of the market weight or is over 50%. An industry is considered as hot if
the CAPM alpha of the industry return in the past 24 month is above the time-series median. Post-entry
performance is measured over the 36-month following the fund inception date. If the fund is closed within
the 36 months, it is still included in the calculation. The sample period is 19912015.
Ten Industry Classication
All 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Panel A: Number of Entrants
Hot 251 31 5 13 25 18 21 13 98 19 8
Cold 223 32 6 7 22 13 11 15 68 40 9
Total 474 63 11 20 47 31 32 28 166 59 17
Panel B: CAPM Aplha
Hot 0.016 0.022 0.149 -0.177 0.211 -0.037 0.079 0.280 -0.009 -0.219 -0.005
Cold 0.232 0.186 -0.120 0.243 -0.137 0.075 0.202 0.155 0.410 0.234 0.559
Dierence -0.216 -0.164 0.269 -0.420 0.348 -0.112 -0.123 0.125 -0.419 -0.453 -0.564
t-stat -2.693 -1.030 1.198 -1.329 1.345 -0.304 -0.746 0.373 -2.652 -1.670 -2.149
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
Hot 0.005 -0.082 0.033 -0.125 0.073 -0.109 -0.043 0.194 0.075 -0.160 -0.068
Cold 0.249 0.056 -0.171 0.164 -0.152 0.105 0.075 0.001 0.607 0.243 0.406
Dierence -0.244 -0.139 0.203 -0.290 0.225 -0.214 -0.118 0.193 -0.532 -0.403 -0.474
t-stat -3.227 -1.114 0.959 -0.862 0.981 -0.628 -0.670 0.699 -3.588 -1.514 -2.055
Panel D: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.019 -0.092 0.016 -0.096 0.035 -0.082 -0.072 0.136 0.023 -0.143 0.008
Cold 0.214 0.080 -0.090 0.124 0.007 0.181 0.116 -0.019 0.419 0.236 0.378
Dierence -0.233 -0.173 0.106 -0.220 0.028 -0.263 -0.189 0.155 -0.396 -0.379 -0.370
t-stat -3.395 -1.411 0.488 -0.804 0.122 -0.811 -1.057 0.627 -2.934 -1.572 -1.717
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Table 1.26: Regressions of Post-Entry Performance on Hot Industry Dummy
Variable
This table reports results of regressions of fund performance in the m months following
its entry on on a dummy variable that equals one if the entrant fund is concentrated
in a hot industry at the time of entry. The dependent variables are measured by the
CAPM alpha, the Fama-French 3-factor alpha, and the Carhart 4-factor alpha. The
sample period is 19912015. Industry xed eects are included in all specications. The
t-statistics reported are calculated using standard errors clustered at industry-year level.
m Coef. t-stat N Adj. Rsq.
Panel A: CAPM Alpha
12 0.047 0.16 474 0.011
24 -0.124 -0.67 474 0.006
36 -0.225 -1.90 474 0.022
60 -0.239 -2.68 474 0.027
Panel B: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
12 -0.113 -0.63 474 0.006
24 -0.241 -2.11 474 0.019
36 -0.264 -2.87 474 0.032
60 -0.230 -3.66 474 0.039
Panel C: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
12 -0.025 -0.14 474 0.006
24 -0.201 -2.02 474 0.011
36 -0.244 -3.48 474 0.017
60 -0.202 -3.91 474 0.021
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Table 1.27: Comparing Post-Entry Performance of Hot and Cold Dividend
Yield Style Entrant Funds
This table compares post-entry performance hot and cold style entrant funds. Entrant
funds are categorized as high or low dividend yield styles by whether the holdings value-
weighted average dividend yield of their holdings are above or below the cross section
median of existing funds. A style is considered as hot if the excess return in the past
24 month is above the time-series median. Post-entry performance is measured over the
36-month following the fund inception date. If the fund is closed within the 36 months,
it is still included in the calculation. The sample period is 19912015.
All Low D/P High D/P
Panel A: Number of Entrants
Hot 1,569 870 699
Cold 1,232 528 704
Total 2,801 1,398 1,403
Panel B: Return in Excess of MKT
Hot -0.071 -0.089 -0.048
Cold 0.051 0.180 -0.046
Dierence -0.121 -0.268 -0.002
t-stat -4.713 -6.403 -0.065
Panel C: CAPM Alpha
Hot -0.040 -0.083 0.014
Cold 0.040 0.102 -0.006
Dierence -0.080 -0.185 0.020
t-stat -3.313 -4.508 0.766
Panel D: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.062 -0.055 -0.070
Cold 0.030 0.190 -0.091
Dierence -0.092 -0.246 0.021
t-stat -4.357 -6.584 1.048
Panel E: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.076 -0.083 -0.068
Cold 0.027 0.126 -0.048
Dierence -0.103 -0.209 -0.020
t-stat -5.296 -6.109 -1.031
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Table 1.28: Regressions of Post-Entry Performance on Hot Dividend Yield
Style Dummy Variable
This table reports results of regressions of fund performance in the m months following
its entry on on a dummy variable that equals one if the entrant fund adopts a hot
dividend yield style. The dependent variables are measured by the CAPM alpha, the
Fama-French 3-factor alpha, and the Carhart 4-factor alpha. The sample period is 1991
2015. Style xed eects are included in all specications. The t-statistics reported are
calculated using standard errors clustered at style-year level.
m Coef. t-stat N Adj. Rsq.
Panel A: Return in Excess of MKT
12 -0.042 -0.28 2,801 0.004
24 -0.098 -0.70 2,801 0.004
36 -0.131 -1.41 2,801 0.010
60 -0.146 -2.33 2,801 0.019
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
12 0.015 0.14 2,801 0.002
24 -0.024 -0.21 2,801 0.000
36 0.079 -0.97 2,801 0.003
60 -0.145 -2.52 2,801 0.021
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
12 0.003 0.05 2,801 0.005
24 -0.083 -1.19 2,801 0.013
36 -0.108 -1.73 2,801 0.020
60 -0.079 -1.83 2,801 0.012
Panel D: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
12 0.045 0.75 2,801 0.005
24 -0.078 -1.26 2,801 0.009
36 -0.112 -2.25 2,801 0.013
60 -0.074 -2.26 2,801 0.007
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Chapter 2
Fund Flows in the Shadow of Stock Trading
Regulation: Evidence from China
2.1 Introduction
Stock exchanges and regulators around the world widely adopt polices that con-
strain trading activities under certain circumstances, with the intention of protecting
investors of the markets they regulate. Two prominent examples of these regulatory
policies are trading halts and trading suspensions.1 Such regulations prevent insider
trading and market manipulation by temporarily preventing the trading of stocks. How-
ever, they might not completely eliminate the liquidity of targeted assets in today's
complex nancial markets. In particular, although polices can eectively restrict trans-
actions in exchanges or over-the-counter markets, there is still transformed liquidity
provided by other investment vehicles, such as open-end mutual funds.2 This fact cre-
ates the possibility that regulatory policies targeting one market may indirectly aect
investors in other markets, thereby complicating the cost-benet analysis at the aggre-
1The largest 10 stock exchanges by total market capitalization of listed stocks as of 2019 are NYSE,
NASDAQ, Tokyo Stock Exchange, Shanghai Stock Exchange, Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Euronext,
London Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Toronto Stock Exchange, and Bombay Stock Ex-
change. All of these exchanges and their regulators have rules for trading halts, trading suspensions, or
both.
2Existing studies mostly examine the direct eects on the markets targeted by such regulations. For
example, Subrahmanyam (1994), Lee, Ready, and Seguin (1994), Corwin and Lipson (2000), Christie,
Corwin, and Harris (2002) study the eects of trading halts in stock markets.
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gate level. Thus, recognizing such potential regulatory spillover eects serves as a crucial
step towards achieving a better regulatory framework for modern nancial markets.
In this study, we document evidence for the eects of stock trading suspensions
on the behavior of mutual fund investors in China. The Chinese stock and mutual fund
markets provide a desirable setting for this purpose because of the prevalence and long
duration of trading suspension events. Both of the two national stock exchanges, the
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), have been
persistently implementing the rules that suspend the trading of individual stocks prior
to major corporate events.3 During the suspension period, rms are required to peri-
odically disclose the progress of the ongoing events, revealing information material to
rm valuations. Since investors cannot trade the stocks, the information is not incorpo-
rated into stock prices, rendering the prices stale. For mutual funds that hold suspended
stocks, this in turn leads to staleness of their net asset values (NAVs) because of the
diculty in making timely and precise adjustments to NAVs. The disparities between
the perceived values of a fund's stock holdings and the fund's NAV calculated using stale
stock prices give rise to predictable future NAV variations: Once trading resumes, stock
prices and fund NAVs will quickly move towards levels that reect existing information.
Such anticipated changes in NAVs can potentially distort fund investors' behaviors.
Using a comprehensive sample of stock trading suspension events and mutual
fund portfolio holdings during 2004-2018, we nd that the highly dispersed stock returns
3For example, the SSE's Stock Listing Rules (2001) allows the exchange or the China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to execute stock trading suspensions in various scenarios, including
merger, acquisition, asset sales and debt restructuring.
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following trading resumptions indeed exert substantial impact on fund NAVs. Given this
fact, we hypothesize that investors' money ows positively respond to the unrealized
impacts of suspended portfolio stocks on future fund NAVs. To test this relation, we
construct an empirical measure, Resumption Impact, as the product of the suspended
stock's weight in the fund portfolio observed by investors and post-resumption stock
return. This measure captures the direction and magnitude of the unrealized impact
of rm-specic information on fund NAV. Consistent with our hypothesis, we nd a
statistically and economically signicant positive response of fund ows to resumption
impact of suspended stocks held by mutual funds. On average, a 1% future impact on
fund NAV during the rst week of trading resumption is associated with 1.1 percentage
point increase in net ows during the quarter before the impact realizes. This result
implies that in the presence of trading suspension rules, fund investors combine both
rm-specic information and fund portfolio disclosure to make investment decisions.
Among trading suspension events with good and bad news, when are fund ows
more responsive to the resumption impact? The heterogeneity in responses is interest-
ing because fund inows and outows have dierent implications on investor welfare and
market stability. Specically, the opportunistic fund ows induced by trading suspen-
sions tend to dilute future fund investment prots and concentrate future fund invest-
ment losses, both at the expense of long-term fund investors. The rst-mover advantage
of moving money out of a fund that holds suspended stocks facing negative information
and over-priced NAV introduces payo complementarity among fund investors (Chen,
Goldstein, and Jiang, 2010). Such a mechanism may exacerbate the risk of mutual fund
run, even in absence of ow-induced trade by the fund manager. Empirically, we nd
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that fund ows are highly sensitive to large positive resumption impacts, while the sensi-
tivities are similar in other cases. This nding suggests that the indirect eect of trading
suspensions is particularly strong when money of outside investors ows into funds that
hold suspended stocks with impactful good rm-specic news.
To provide further support for the interpretation that the ow response we docu-
ment is driven by investors' investigation of suspended stocks in disclosed fund portfolios,
we develop two placebo tests. These tests exploit institutional facts on dierential tim-
ings and scopes of quarterly, semi-annual and annual fund disclosure reports. The rst
test shows that fund ows do not appear to respond to future resumption impact if
the suspended stock is held by the fund at the end of the quarter just prior to trading
resumption, but is not held at the end of the previous quarter. The absence of ow
response in this case is likely because investors can only observe the most recent end-of-
quarter holdings snapshot when making investment decisions. In the second test, we nd
that fund ows do not respond to the resumption impact of non-top-10 stock holdings
disclosed in fund annual reports, which are published with a delay up to 90 business
days.4 Therefore mutual fund portfolio disclosure serves as the channel through which
stock trading suspensions aect fund investor behaviors.
This study contributes to studies of trading regulations by focusing on the in-
direct eects on the behaviors of investors in the open-end mutual fund market. We
show that trading suspension policy induces opportunistic fund investors to purchase
and redeem fund shares to exploit stale fund NAVs. Such informed ows earn better
4Section 2 explains mandatory disclosure requirements on Chinese mutual funds.
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returns at the cost of buy-and-hold investors. Considering the costly search process of
investigating rm announcements and fund portfolio holdings, trading suspension could
lead to a net welfare loss among aggregate fund investors. Therefore, our ndings call for
a better integrated regulatory framework that takes the potential spillovers of policies
into account. The evidence documented here is related to the whack-a-mole game that
Cai, He, Jiang, and Xiong (2017) use in describing the spillover eects of increased stock
transaction tax on trading activities in the warrant market.
Our study is related to a large literature on investor ows to asset managers as
surveyed by Christoersen, Musto, and Wermers (2014), especially papers that study
the ows that exploit stale fund NAVs (Chalmers, Edelen, and Kadlec, 2001; Goetz-
mann, Ivkovi¢, and Rouwenhorst, 2001; Boudoukh, Richardson, Subrahmanyam, and
Whitelaw, 2002; Greene and Hodges, 2002; Zitzewitz, 2006; Choi, Kronlund, and Oh,
2019). In these papers, stale NAVs arise from non-synchronous trading or the illiquid
nature of portfolio securities. Our study diers from existing research by studying a
setting in which the staleness of NAVs comes as an unintended consequence of stock
trading regulations.
Two existing papers also examine the eects of stock trading suspensions in the
Chinese market. Huang, Shi, Song, and Zhao (2018) study the determinants of trading
suspension and document the trading patterns and performance of stock investors during
the 2015 market crash. Liu, Xu, and Zhong (2017) show that trading restrictions can lead
to negative contagion during stock market crash episodes because fund managers facing
redemption pressure are forced to sell portfolio stocks that are not suspended. Instead
of stock investors or fund managers who directly trade stocks, this study focuses on fund
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ows as responses to rm-specic news during trading suspensions. We evaluate this
economic channel over 14 years of sample period and our results are robust to exclusion
of the 2015 market crash period.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes the
institutional background of the empirical setting, and Section 2.3 explains our sample
and empirical measures. Section 2.4 presents the results of the main empirical tests.
Section 2.5 performs additional tests for robustness and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background
2.2.1 Stock Trading Suspension
Since the 1990s, trading suspension has been a common policy tool in the Chi-
nese stock market. Regulators require rms whose equity shares are publicly traded
on China's Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) to
apply for trading suspensions when they prepare for major corporate events. Without
any strict implementation rule, Chinese public rms can discretionarily apply for trad-
ing suspensions to prevent information leakage before the announcements of corporate
events. In practice, rms also take advantage of this regulatory policy to prevent the
trading of their stocks for other purposes.5
2.2.2 Mutual Funds in China
Since its inception in 1998, the Chinese mutual fund industry has experienced
fast growth along with the economy. According to the Asset Management Association
5See Huang, Shi, Song, and Zhao (2018) for more detailed discussion.
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of China, by the end of June of 2018, the size of total assets under management reached
12.7 trillion CNY (approximately 1.8 trillion USD). Similar to mutual funds in the US
market, equity shares of publicly traded domestic rms serve as one of the major nancial
asset classes held by Chinese funds.
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) requires mutual funds to
publicly disclose their portfolio holdings since 2004. Regulatory rules mandate six reports
every year. In each of the four quarterly reports, mutual funds disclose only the top-
10 stock holdings. In contrast, full stock portfolios at the end of June and December
are disclosed in the semiannual and annual reports. The timeliness of these reports
also dier: the maximum number of days allowed between the end of period and the
disclosure for quarterly reports are 15 business days, while the corresponding intervals are
60 calendar days and 90 calendar days for semiannual and annual reports, respectively.
2.3 Data
We combine multiple datasets of mutual fund and stock market information from
the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. This section de-
scribes our sample and empirical measures.
2.3.1 Mutual Funds
CSMAR provides comprehensive coverage of both operating and defunct mutual
funds domiciled in China. We obtain data on fund return, net asset value (NAV), net
assets, portfolio holdings, and other information contained in fund quarterly and semi-
annual reports. We focus on open-end mutual funds that directly hold stocks and are
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traded mainly through investors' direct fund share purchase and redemption. Therefore,
we drop funds that are classied as exchange-traded funds (ETFs), listed open-end
funds (LOFs), or funds of funds (FOFs). We also exclude funds that have more than one
share classes because these are primarily structured funds whose share classes have very
dierent exposures to the fund portfolios (Li, 2017). These lters leave us with 2,550
unique funds.
Fund return and NAV are observed at the daily frequency, while net assets are
observed at the quarterly frequency. We compute quarterly fund-level ow as
Flowj,t =
TNAj,t − TNAj,t−1 × (1 + rj,t)
TNAj,t−1 × (1 + rj,t)
, (2.1)
where TNAj,t is the total net assets of fund j at the end of quarter t, and rj,t is the
return earned by fund investors from the end of quarter (t − 1) to the end of quarter
t. By construction, this ow measure is bounded from below by −1. Following the
literature, we trim the ows at 1% and 99% to avoid the inuence of extreme net ows
on our results.
Starting from July 2004, funds are required by CSRC to disclose their top-10
stock holdings in their quarterly reports, and full portfolio holdings in semi-annual and
annual reports. Therefore, we set our sample period as 2004Q3-2018Q2. We use the
top-10 quarterly stock holdings in our main results primarily for the measurement of
fund ow. We use the full portfolio holdings in our extended tests. The semi-annual




We consider all A Share stocks ever listed on the main board of the Shanghai
Stock Exchange (SSE), the main board, Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) board or
Small/Medium Enterprise (SME) board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). This
results in 3,636 stocks and they account for more than 95% of equity holdings of sample
funds. CSMAR collects all trading suspension incidences from public announcements
posted to the stock exchanges. The dataset includes the dates and times of the an-
nouncements of trading suspension and subsequent resumption events.
During our sample period, 3,437 out of the 3,636 sample stocks experienced at
least one instance of a trading suspension. In total, there are 97,934 suspension events.
The duration of suspension ranges from 0 to 1,679 trading days. Intraday trading sus-
pension events usually happen during the hour of mandatory corporate disclosure or
follow large price volatility. These suspension events are short-lived and are less relevant
for the purpose of this study, so we exclude them from the sample. This lter leaves us
with 16,611 stock suspension events. In 5,063 events, the stocks involved are suspended
from trading for at least 21 trading days (about one calendar month).
For suspension events with relatively longer period, rms typically make a se-
quence of public announcements on the progress of the corporate events. Trading re-
sumptions usually follow the announcements of eventual outcomes with some lag. Be-
sides, rms typically announce future resumption dates publicly before they happen.
This timing feature gives fund investors sucient time to digest the new information.
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2.3.3 Return
We measure stock returns and mutual fund performance using both raw returns
and abnormal returns adjusted for the exposure to stock market movements. We obtain
daily stock returns directly from the CSMAR database, and calculate daily fund returns
using data on daily NAVs, adjusting for fund share splits and distributions. To compute
market-adjusted daily abnormal returns for stocks and mutual funds, we estimate the
market beta with a rolling regression for each stock- and fund-quarter using 100 non-
missing daily returns prior to the beginning of the quarter. For all days in the quarter,
we calculate abnormal returns as out-of-sample alphas using these estimated betas and
realized market returns. We use the CSI 300 index return as a proxy for the stock market
return, and one-year bank deposit interest rate as the risk-free rate. For mutual funds,
we additionally control for the return exposure to aggregate bond market return proxied
by the CSI Aggregate Bond Index return since many mutual funds also invest in bonds.
2.3.4 Resumption Impact
Trading suspension events are typically associated with public announcements of
major rm-specic events, and stock prices often exhibit large variations immediately
following trading resumptions. While suspended stocks can not be traded during suspen-
sion periods and the market prices of these stocks are largely xed at the pre-suspension
levels, NAVs of mutual funds are calculated based on market price of portfolio assets
on a daily basis and investors can purchase and redeem at the NAVs calculated on each
trading day. When funds hold large proportion of stocks that experience trading sus-
pensions, their NAVs can be substantially aected by post-resumption stock returns.
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Investors can potentially prot from short-term stock mispricing due to trading suspen-
sion by investing in the mutual funds that hold sizable positions in these stocks based
on announced rm-specic information. For this to be feasible, a necessary condition is
that the resumption impact is large enough to not be washed away by price variations
of other portfolio stocks, and the fund does not properly adjust stock valuation during
suspension period.
To empirically validate the inuence of post-resumption stock returns on fund re-
turns, we construct a fund-stock-level measure to capture the impact of post-resumption
stock price variations on fund NAV:
RIi,j,t = Weighti,j,t ×Return[τ,τ+∆τ ]i,t , (2.2)
where Weighti,j,t is fund j's portfolio weight of suspension stock i at the end of quarter
t, and Return
[τ,τ+∆τ ]
i,t is stock i's return over ∆τ horizon from resumption date τ in
the next quarter. Specically, we rst select all trading suspension events that last
at least one day, and match them by resumption dates to all quarterly fund holding
records with at least a 1% portfolio weight. To ensure that the stock is certainly held
by the fund before resumption, we require that trading suspensions must happen before
the end of the quarter prior to resumption.6 Next, we match each resumption date to
daily fund share class cumulative NAVs and daily adjusted stock prices to compute both
post-resumption returns over ∆τ = 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 and 15 trading days.
We examine the correlation between fund returns and the resumption impact
measure for trading suspension events in our sample. Figure 2.2 plots that fund return
6We only observe stock holdings at the end of quarters. If we also include suspension events that
occur after holding snapshot dates, results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
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and stock resumption impact are strongly positively correlated over the 5-day window
following stock resumption. Table 2.1 further shows that this correlation holds for hori-
zons ranging from 1 to 15 trading days, and the correlation is especially strong for cases
where the funds are exposed to large post-resumption stock price variations. For ex-
ample, the correlation between 5-day fund return and 5-day stock resumption impact
following the resumption is 0.3 for the subsample where the magnitude of resumption
impact is greater than 1%. Such events are not rare since we have 3,205 events like this in
our sample. The correlation increases as we focus on subsamples with larger resumption
impact. The correlation between fund return and stock resumption impact implies that
investors can potentially exploit public rm-specic information by investing in funds
that hold sizable positions in suspended stocks and benet from the price movement of
such stocks after they resume trading.
2.3.5 Sample Construction
We construct a panel dataset of fund-quarter observations following the timing
convention illustrated in Figure 2.1. The 15-day delay in quarterly portfolio disclosure
implies that investors can only observe stocks held by funds at the end of quarter t− 1
when making decisions during quarter t. We use the post-resumption stock return real-
ized after quarter t as a proxy for investor expectation on future stock price movements
conditional on information observed by t. Suppose fund j is perceived to hold stock i
that experiences suspension in quarter t and resumes during quarter t + 1, we match
RIi,j,t to fund level variables corresponding to quarter t. To be included in the sample, we
require the gap between ow date t and resumption date τ to be no more than 2 months
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(42 trading days) so that investors are likely to exploit disclosed rm-level information
by t.7 If more than one portfolio stocks experience trading suspension in a quarter, we
aggregate RIi,j,t to the fund level by summing them up to reect the overall impact on
fund NAV. If none of the top-10 stock holdings involves suspension, we assign zero value
to this measure for that fund-quarter. Finally, we exclude observations in which a fund
manages less than 50 million CNY (approximately 7 million USD) or has an age less
than 1 year. This leaves us with a sample of 26,211 fund-quarter observations.
Panel A of Table 2.2 reports summary statistics of our sample. Potentially due
to the fast growth of this industry, overall existing mutual funds experience net money
outows, even though on average they generate 1.51% quarterly market-adjusted abnor-
mal return before fees. An average fund has operated for around 5 years, with slightly
more than 2 billion CNY (approximately 300 million USD) assets under management.
In Panel B, only observations with at least one portfolio stock suspension events are
reported. The resumption impact measured over short time windows has mean and me-
dian close to zero, but exhibit large dispersion, especially on both tails. This implies that
observations with large exposure to post-resumption stock price jumps are associated
with sizable changes on fund NAV once trading resumes. More than half of the sample
funds, and most of fund families, experience resumption impact at least once. This fact
allows us to examine investors' response to complicated information environment under
general conditions.
7Section 5.4 show that our results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar if we change the lter




We consider the following baseline regression specication to detect whether fund
investors respond to rm-specic information of suspended stocks by purchasing or re-
deeming mutual fund shares:
Flowj,t = β1 × RI j,t+1 + Γ× Controlsj,t−1 + δt + γj + εj,t. (2.3)
The main explanatory variable of interest, RIj,t+1, is the fund-level Resumption Impact
on fund j due to stocks that are perceived to be held by the fund and resume trading
in quarter t + 1. We adopt a time subscript t + 1 for this variable because the returns
on suspended stocks following their resumption used to construct this measure are cal-
culated in quarter t + 1. The portfolio weights are based on fund portfolio disclosure
for the end of quarter t− 1. RI is intended to capture the expected eect of suspended
stocks on fund returns. Fund-level control variables include fund performance, log of
fund size, log of fund age, log of fund family size, value-weighted average performance of
other funds in the fund family, fund return volatility measured as standard deviation of
trailing 12-month fund returns normalized to quarterly terms, purchase fee, redemption
fee, and expense ratio. All control variables are lagged by one quarter. In addition,
the specication includes fund xed eects to absorb fund-level time invariant hetero-
geneities that aect ows, and time xed eects to account for aggregate time-specic
shocks that aect ows to all mutual funds.
Table 2.3 reports the results of the baseline regression. Column (1) shows that
investors do respond to opportunities of trading suspended stocks through purchasing
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and redeeming mutual fund shares. Controlling for fund performance in the recent past,
fund-specic and time-specic constant factors that aect fund ows, Resumption Impact
due to stock holdings that are expected to resume in the next quarter has a positive and
signicant inuence on ows in the current quarter. The estimated coecient remains
similar in magnitude and signicance when additional fund-level control variables are
included in the regression, or when abnormal returns are used to measure stock and
fund performance. Across all columns, we obtain coecients on RI(5d) close to 1. This
implies that on average, an additional 1% of 5-day fund-level Resumption Impact is
associated with an additional 1% quarterly fund ow. As an hypothetical example,
suppose a fund holds a 10% position in a stock at the end of quarter t − 1, the stock
is suspended at the end of quarter t, and resumes trading in quarter t+ 1. If the stock
earns 10% return over the 5 days following resumption, the fund would have experienced
1% higher ow during quarter t compared to an otherwise similar fund whose NAV is
not aected by trading resumption of portfolio stocks.
2.4.2 When is Flow More Responsive to Resumption Impact?
Given the baseline results, a natural question is whether the ow response to
Resumption Impact is mostly driven by events where the stock suspension events are
associated with positive prospects or those come along with negative prospects. Theo-
retically, such two types of events dier in both potential responding investors and their
incentives. For positive rm news, all investors can choose to invest money into the
fund, and the money inow dilutes existing buy-and-hold fund investors' value because
fund NAVs do not reect the value of suspended stocks in a timely manner. For negative
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news, only existing fund shareholders can redeem money. The remaining fund investors
can be hurt by redeeming investors because the latter group can redeem at NAVs higher
than what would reect the ecient price of suspended stocks in the fund portfolio.
This mechanism could potentially amplify the ow-induced trades' market-destabilizing
eects, as emphasized by Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010) and Goldstein, Jiang, and
Ng (2017). Given the important dierences between these potential implications, we use
several interaction specications to examine how the ow response depends on Resump-
tion Impact.
To do this, we augment the baseline specication with a dummy variable that
equals one if Resumption Impact is positive and its interaction with the Resumption
Impact.
Flowj,t = β1 × RI j,t+1 + β2 × 1{RI>0} + β3 × RI j,t+1 × 1{RI>0}
+ Γ× Controlsj,t−1 + δt + γj + εj,t. (2.4)
Moreover, we evaluate whether ows are more sensitive to impactful events by replacing
1{RI>0} with dummy variables Left Tail and Right Tail. These two variables are equal
to one if Resumption Impact is larger than 3% or smaller than −3%, respectively.
The results of interaction specications are reported in Table 2.4. Across all spec-
ications, the coecients on Resumption Impact are positive and statistically signicant.
The magnitudes are similar to those in the baseline results. For dummy variables Positive
and Left Tail, the coecients on the interaction term are statistically indistinguishable
from zero, suggesting that the sensitivity of ow to suspended stocks associated with
positive prospects and impactful negative events are similar to other events. In contrast,
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for dummy variable Right Tail, the estimated coecients are positive, signicant and
three to six times as large as the baseline estimate. Overall, the results in this table
indicate that fund ow responds to both positive and negative Resumption Impact with
similar magnitudes, but the response is particularly strong to impactful good news. This
asymmetry in intensity of ow response is consistent with the notion that mutual fund
shares cannot be short-sold, hence limiting the response to negative resumption impact.
On the other hand, regardless of whether already holding the fund shares or not, both
existing and new investors could respond to positive news by investing in the fund.
2.4.3 Portfolio Disclosure and Flow Responses
We interpret the results above as that investors investigate fund holdings and
move money into or out of funds that hold suspended stocks based on rm-specic
information announced during trading suspension. To lend further support to this inter-
pretation, we develop two placebo tests that exploit two institutional features of Chinese
mutual fund stock holdings disclosure rules: the timing of report publication, and the
range of disclosure.
2.4.3.1 Unobserved Top-10 Holdings
One necessary condition for fund ows to respond to rm-specic information
of suspended stocks is that fund investors perceive the fund to be holding the relevant
stocks. It is important to recognize that for fund investors, the most timely information
about fund stock holdings comes from disclosure reports corresponding to the previous
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quarter-end.8 Since investors cannot observe the actual stock holdings at the end of the
current quarter, quarterly fund ows should not respond to rm news if the suspended
stocks will have an impact on future NAV but were not on the top-10 holdings list at
the end of the previous quarter.
To provide supporting evidence for this conjecture, we recalculate Resumption
Impact using stocks that appear on holdings disclosed for the end of the concurrent
quarter, but not on top-10 holdings disclosed for the previous quarter-end. These stock
positions are ex post in the fund portfolios, but are not observed by investors while
they make investment decisions during the current quarter. This modied measure is
intended to capture the expected eects of suspended stocks on future fund NAV returns
due to stocks that the funds actually hold but are ex ante unknown to investors.
Table 2.5 reports the results of regressing quarterly fund ows on the recalculated
Resumption Impact. In contrast to our baseline ndings, the estimated coecients on
this modied measure become statistically insignicant. These results suggest that ows
do not respond to rm-specic news of stock holdings if investors cannot observe them
when making investment decisions.
2.4.3.2 Unobserved Non-Top-10 Holdings
There is another situation in which a fund might actually hold suspended stocks
that can substantially aect future NAV in predictable ways, but the investors are unable
to observe these holdings. This possibility arises from the fact that only the top-10 stock
8Quarterly portfolio reports are disclosed within 15 business days from the end of each quarter.
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holdings are disclosed in fund quarterly reports. Although full disclosures of complete
portfolios are available in semi-annual and annual reports, investors can only observe
top-10 holdings in timely manner because these two reports are signicantly delayed.9
The dierential timeliness of disclosed top-10 holdings and full portfolios creates
an interesting setting for our study. As Table 2.2 shows, for less-diversied funds, stock
positions below top-10 holdings can still materially aect the future NAV if the rms
experience major news. Because of the long reporting lags, it is unlikely that investors
can observe non-top-10 stock holdings of a fund during Q1. Therefore, while fund ows
in Q1 might respond to Resumption Impact of stocks in top-10 Q4-end disclosure, there
should be no response to Resumption Impact of non-top-10 Q4-end holdings.
To empirically examine this conjecture, we calculate Non-top-10 RI as the Re-
sumption Impact of stocks among the non-top-10 holdings of a fund's portfolio disclosed
in its annual report. By construction, Non-top-10 RI is equal to 0 for fund-quarters
not in Q1. We only use non-top-10 holdings in annual reports because the 90-day re-
porting lag leaves investors no time to respond in the concurrent quarter and provides
a clean setting. Table 2.6 reports the results of regressions of fund ows on both RI
and Non-top-10 RI. Column (1) repeats the baseline result for comparison. Column
(2) shows that Non-top-10 RI does not appear to aect ows, presumably because the
relevant holdings are not observable to investors while they make investment decisions
in the concurrent quarter. Column (3) and (4) exclude fund-quarter observations with
non-zero RI in quarters other than Q1, and obtain similar results. Column (5) to (7)
9Semi-annual and annual reports have lags of 60 and 90 calendar days, respectively.
87
use abnormal return as return and performance measures and yield similar results.
In sum, these placebo tests highlight the key role of fund portfolio disclosure
in facilitating fund investors' informed investment decisions: trading suspension aects
fund ows only when the holdings of suspended stocks are publicly reported.
2.4.4 Do Individual or Institutional Flows Respond More to Resumption
Impact?
The prior literature nds that ows from individual investors to mutual funds
behave dierently from those from institutional investors (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002,
Goyal and Wahal, 2008, Evans and Fahlenbrach, 2012). Institutional investors tend to
monitor fund performance more carefully and impose more discipline on the operation of
asset managers. We might therefore expect institutional ows to respond more strongly
to resumption impacts on funds holding suspended stock becuase they pay closer atten-
tion to fund operations.
We examine the potential heterogeneity in responsiveness to resumption impact
between individual ows and institutional ows using data on decomposition of fund
ownership disclosed in fund semi-annual and annual reports. To compare the ow re-
sponses from dierent investor bases, we create a dummy variable High Institutional
Ratio that equals to one if the fund has more than 50% assets in the hands of insti-
tutional investors according to its disclosure for the most recent half-year-end.10 We
then interact this High Institutional Ratio dummy variable with RI to augment our
baseline specication. Table 2.7 reports the results of this interaction specication. The
10The 50% cuto roughly corresponds to the 80th percentile of the sample.
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coecient of RI is positive and signicant, conrming that individual ows respond to
trading opportunities on suspended stocks held by funds. More interestingly, the coef-
cient of the interaction term between RI and High Institutional Ratio is positive and
large compare to the baseline coecient, albeit marginally statistically signicant. The
evidence is modest but lends some support to the notion that institutional investors pay
closer attention to trading opportunities that exploit stale fund NAVs due to suspended
stocks in fund portfolios.
2.5 Robustness
We report that our main results are not driven by specic time episodes with
volatile markets, and are robust to using dierent sample and variable lters.
2.5.1 The 2015 Crash Period
In June and July of 2015, the Chinese stock market experienced a dramatic
crash. More than a half of all the stocks are in suspension status at the peak of the
episode. The focus of our study is not on this period and is broader about the stock and
mutual fund markets, though the crash is an important event and has been explored
more carefully by other researchers (Huang, Shi, Song, and Zhao (2018), Liu, Xu, and
Zhong (2017)). Nonetheless, one may worry that our ndings are driven by these crash
period observations. To address this, we repeat our baseline regression in Table 2.8
by excluding the observations in the two quarters, 2015Q2 and 2015Q3, surrounding
the crash period. When using 5-day post-resumption raw returns as proxy for trading
opportunities on suspended stocks, column (1) of Table 2.8 shows that the ow response
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to positive opportunities is 1.026, comparable to the baseline estimate 1.059 obtained
using the full sample. In column (2), we report the results using the subsample that
includes only observations during the crash period, and nd positive but statistically
insignicant coecient on 5-day Resumption Impact. Column (3) and (4) repeat the
tests using abnormal returns as stock and fund performance measures, and nd similar
results. These results verify that our main ndings are not driven by extreme events in
the stock crash period.
2.5.2 Horizon of Measuring Resumption Impact
For our main specications, we construct measures of Resumption Impact using 5-
day stock returns following resumption of trading. We show in Table 2.9 that perturbing
this arbitrary choice of return horizon is not crucial for our main ndings.
2.5.3 Portfolio Weight in the Construction of Resumption Impact
In the baseline specications, Resumption Impact for fund j in quarter t, RIj,t+1,
is constructed using 5-day post-resumption returns for suspended holdings during quar-
ter t + 1, and portfolio weights at the end of quarter t − 1. We choose to use quarter
t − 1 portfolio weights to reect investors' information from holdings disclosures they
observe during quarter t. However, this may cause inaccuracy in measuring the impact
of post-resumption returns of stocks on fund NAVs because the portfolio weights may
have changed, due to adjustments of other non-suspended stock positions, from the end
of quarter t− 1 to the resumption dates. To evaluate the impact of this issue, we recon-
struct RIj,t+1 using portfolio weights at the end of quarter t. Although this information
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is not observed by investors at the time ow happens, it presumably gives us a more
accurate measure of the impact of stock resumption returns on fund NAVs. We repeat
the baseline regression using this modied resumption impact measure, and report the
results in Table 2.10. Compared to the baseline results in Table 2.3, using the alternative
Resumption Impact measure does not introduce material changes to the results, except
for slightly increasing the coecients on Resumption Impact.
2.5.4 Extreme Flow Observations
Table 2.11 show that our main results are robust to excluding extreme ow ob-
servations at dierent level. The magnitude of coecient decreased as we exclude more
ow observations at the two tails, but the eect remains statistically strong.
2.5.5 Time Window from Flow Quarter-End to Stock Resumption Date
When calculating Resumption Impact, we restrict that the suspended stocks are
resumed in the rst 2 months (42 trading days) of the next quarter. The purpose is
to exclude the stocks that are resumed too distant in the future so that investors in
the concurrent quarter are less likely to be condent about the fair value of the stock
and act in the mutual fund market accordingly. At the same time, we want to keep as
many valid observations as possible. Nonetheless, we show in Table 2.12 that our main
results are generally robust to changing this lter to 1 month or removing this lter.
As expected, the eect is weakened if the time window lter is removed. Notably, the
magnitude of the eect is similar to using a 2-month lter. The statistical signicance
is lower presumably because less valid observations end up with non-zero Resumption
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Impact. Overall, this shows that the 2-month lter is an innocuous empirical compromise
and our results are not an artifact of sample selection.
2.6 Conclusion
Existing research on nancial regulations largely focus on the direct eects of
regulatory policies on targeted markets and participants. This study's empirical ndings
highlight how trading regulations can have unintended consequences in other markets.
Trading suspensions prevent stock prices from timely incorporating publicly available
information, rendering stock prices stale. Though such stale prices cannot be directly
exploited in the stock market, investors can trade mutual funds with stale NAVs due to
their inability to adjust for values of holdings of suspended stocks. We show that money
ows positively respond to unrealized impact on fund NAVs for mutual funds that hold
stocks that experience trading suspensions. These opportunistic investor ows tend
to dilute future fund prots and concentrate future fund losses, imposing externalities
on long-term fund investors. Thus, the welfare of investors are aected by the trading
regulations beyond investors in the stock markets. Our ndings prompt policy makers to





Table 2.1: Correlation Between Stock Return on Fund NAV Return Following Resumption
Panel A: Raw Return
correlation between if |portfolio weight × 5-day return|
portfolio weight × post-resumption return fund return after resumption all > 1% > 3% > 5%
1 day 1 day 0.047 0.127 0.257 0.458
3 days 3 days 0.114 0.247 0.321 0.344
5 days 5 days 0.163 0.300 0.428 0.445
7 days 7 days 0.159 0.337 0.486 0.583
10 days 10 days 0.244 0.336 0.465 0.576
15 days 15 days 0.310 0.376 0.478 0.522
# events 16,556 3,205 362 64
Panel B: Abnormal Return
correlation between if |portfolio weight × 5-day return|
portfolio weight × post-resumption return fund return after resumption all > 1% > 3% > 5%
1 day 1 day 0.115 0.172 0.442 0.632
3 days 3 days 0.119 0.164 0.260 0.384
5 days 5 days 0.157 0.239 0.367 0.438
7 days 7 days 0.194 0.269 0.397 0.525
10 days 10 days 0.192 0.254 0.363 0.467
15 days 15 days 0.218 0.273 0.382 0.403
# events 16,556 3,205 362 64
94
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics of fund characteristics. Only non-structured open-end mutual funds
are included in the sample. The unit of observation is fund-quarter where a fund les a quarterly report.
Fund ows and returns are calculated for quarterly intervals. Fund TNA is reported in million CNY. Fund
ages are reported in number of years. Fund ows are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels.
Panel A: All Fund-Quarters
Varaible N Mean Std p1 p10 p25 Median p75 p90 p99
Fund Flow 26,221 -3.47% 23.98% -53.77% -23.54% -10.94% -3.95% -0.29% 10.37% 99.88%
Raw Return
Fund Performance 26,221 2.69% 12.09% -27.16% -9.84% -2.74% 1.39% 6.72% 17.31% 41.12%
Family Performance 26,170 2.05% 9.36% -20.96% -7.87% -2.16% 1.22% 4.97% 14.14% 30.87%
Abnormal Return
Fund Performance 25,926 1.51% 8.21% -21.56% -5.77% -1.73% 0.74% 4.02% 9.26% 32.37%
Family Performance 25,875 0.90% 5.60% -17.56% -3.47% -1.24% 0.37% 2.63% 6.18% 20.59%
Fund TNA 26,228 2,198 3,569 54 106 266 931 2,593 5,762 16,641
Fund Age 26,228 4.97 3.19 1.28 1.62 2.33 4.08 6.93 9.78 13.89
Fund Return Volatility 26,219 5.68% 3.89% 0.25% 0.93% 2.90% 4.97% 7.85% 11.21% 17.00%
Family TNA 26,228 36,133 35,700 514 4,543 10,325 24,581 48,069 85,114 151,947
Purchase Fee 26,108 0.01% 0.07% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
Redemption Fee 26,039 0.03% 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.50%




Panel B: Event Fund-Quarters
Varaible N Mean Std p1 p10 p25 Median p75 p90 p99
Fund Flow 4,588 -4.94% 24.77% -54.09% -27.67% -13.57% -5.12% -1.03% 10.68% 101.91%
Raw Return
RI(3d) 4,497 0.05% 1.11% -2.92% -1.10% -0.46% 0.03% 0.52% 1.22% 3.54%
RI(5d) 4,497 0.04% 1.45% -3.83% -1.31% -0.57% -0.02% 0.52% 1.41% 4.88%
RI(7d) 4,497 0.07% 1.72% -4.14% -1.40% -0.61% -0.04% 0.54% 1.54% 6.33%
RI(10d) 4,497 0.08% 1.92% -4.58% -1.42% -0.65% -0.08% 0.49% 1.60% 7.12%
Fund Performance 4,588 4.62% 14.61% -30.51% -11.45% -2.92% 2.83% 11.52% 24.17% 45.72%
Family Performance 4,583 3.50% 10.29% -21.41% -8.06% -1.40% 2.19% 9.01% 17.02% 32.61%
Abnormal Return
RI(3d) 4,539 -0.01% 1.08% -3.23% -1.15% -0.49% 0.04% 0.47% 1.08% 2.96%
RI(5d) 4,539 -0.09% 1.38% -4.25% -1.48% -0.64% -0.03% 0.46% 1.21% 3.81%
RI(7d) 4,539 -0.10% 1.57% -4.94% -1.56% -0.69% -0.06% 0.46% 1.28% 4.71%
RI(10d) 4,539 -0.13% 1.71% -5.13% -1.62% -0.71% -0.11% 0.43% 1.32% 5.10%
Fund Performance 4,506 2.54% 11.91% -31.40% -8.51% -2.78% 1.55% 6.88% 15.92% 40.91%
Family Performance 4,501 1.41% 7.38% -23.20% -4.56% -1.28% 0.85% 4.04% 9.63% 24.30%
Fund TNA 4,588 1,926 2,775 54 107 270 934 2,442 4,868 13,057
Fund Age 4,588 5.48 3.32 1.28 1.75 2.62 4.76 7.91 10.45 13.60
Fund Return Volatility 4,588 7.30% 4.22% 0.97% 2.89% 4.02% 6.05% 10.24% 13.58% 18.64%
Family TNA 4,588 33,506 33,583 376 3,716 9,130 22,878 44,380 79,264 146,585
Purchase Fee 4,583 0.02% 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.10%
Redemption Fee 4,570 0.03% 0.12% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.50%




Panel C: Top-10 Holding Positions
Rank of Holding N Mean Std p1 p10 p25 Median p75 p90 p99
1 23,697 5.69% 2.68% 0.06% 1.79% 4.00% 5.69% 7.72% 9.25% 10.63%
2 23,453 4.75% 2.31% 0.04% 1.42% 3.28% 4.78% 6.21% 7.91% 9.71%
3 23,280 4.18% 2.06% 0.03% 1.22% 2.95% 4.19% 5.40% 6.88% 9.27%
4 23,113 3.77% 1.86% 0.03% 1.11% 2.69% 3.78% 4.90% 6.07% 8.73%
5 22,976 3.45% 1.68% 0.02% 1.04% 2.48% 3.45% 4.49% 5.43% 7.98%
6 22,822 3.18% 1.53% 0.02% 0.98% 2.30% 3.18% 4.12% 5.00% 7.28%
7 22,695 2.95% 1.39% 0.01% 0.94% 2.16% 2.99% 3.82% 4.64% 6.54%
8 22,560 2.75% 1.28% 0.01% 0.89% 2.05% 2.83% 3.54% 4.27% 5.86%
9 22,440 2.58% 1.17% 0.01% 0.86% 1.96% 2.66% 3.29% 3.99% 5.31%
10 22,333 2.42% 1.08% 0.01% 0.82% 1.86% 2.50% 3.08% 3.70% 4.92%
Average 23,697 3.52% 1.64% 0.03% 1.01% 2.59% 3.63% 4.61% 5.52% 7.18%
Sum 23,697 34.75% 16.78% 0.15% 8.38% 25.17% 36.14% 45.97% 55.07% 71.48%97
Table 2.3: Baseline Regression
This table reports results in baseline specication. The dependent variable is quarterly
fund ow, and observations are at fund-quarter level. The variable of interest, Resump-
tion Impact (5d), is holding-weighted sum of 5-trading day post-resumption stock return,
calculated based on disclosed top-10 fund portfolio holdings at the quarter end prior to
the reference date. In the rst two columns, Resumption Impact (5d), Fund Perfor-
mance and Family Performance are measured using raw returns. In columns (3)-(4),
Resumption Impact (5d) is measured using stock-market adjusted abnormal return, and
Fund Performance and Family Performance are measured using stock- and bond-market
adjusted abnormal return. The fund itself is excluded when calculating family TNA and
performance. All control variables are lagged by one quarter. Standard errors are clus-
tered at fund level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent
10%, 5%, and 1% level of signicance.
Raw Return Abnormal Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Resumption Impact (5d) 1.097*** 1.059*** 1.205*** 1.120***
(3.575) (3.585) (3.858) (3.703)
Fund Performance 0.327*** 0.343*** 0.405*** 0.426***
(8.380) (8.590) (11.946) (12.713)
Log TNA -0.071*** -0.072***
(-14.425) (-14.244)
Log Age -0.003 -0.001
(-0.358) (-0.094)
Log Familiy TNA 0.013** 0.014***
(2.447) (2.606)
Family Performance 0.219*** 0.113*
(3.738) (1.852)
Fund Return Volatility -0.178* -0.417***
(-1.655) (-3.918)
Purchase Fee -4.702* -7.356*
(-1.666) (-1.929)
Redemption Fee 12.560 3.674
(0.822) (0.170)
Expense Ratio 1.757 2.152
(0.246) (0.300)
Fund FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26,052 25,776 25,757 25,493
R-squared 0.130 0.155 0.132 0.158
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Table 2.4: Interaction Specication
This table reports results of modied baseline regressions that include interaction terms.
The dependent variable is quarterly fund ow, and observations are at fund-quarter level.
Variable Resumption Impact (5d), or RI(5d), is holding-weighted sum of 5-trading day
post-resumption stock return, calculated based on disclosed top-10 fund portfolio hold-
ings at the quarter end prior to the reference date. 1RI(5d)>0 is an indicator variable that
equals one if Resumption Impact (5d) is positive. Left Tail and Right Tail are indicator
variables that equal one if |RI(5d)| > 3% on the corresponding tail of distribution. In
Panel A, RI(5d), Fund Performance and Family Performance are measured using raw
returns. In Panel B, RI(5d) is measured using stock-market adjusted abnormal return,
and Fund Performance and Family Performance are measured using stock- and bond-
market adjusted abnormal return. The fund itself is excluded when calculating family
TNA and performance. All control variables are lagged by one quarter. Standard er-
rors are clustered at fund level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of signicance.
Panel A: Raw Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RI (5d) 1.216*** 1.323*** 0.952** 0.887** 1.068*** 1.082***
(2.861) (3.145) (2.573) (2.486) (2.828) (2.936)
Positive -0.012* -0.013*
(-1.769) (-1.838)
RI (5d) * Positive 0.235 -0.000
(0.331) (-0.000)
Left Tail -0.107* -0.094
(-1.870) (-1.623)
RI (5d) * Left Tail -1.534 -1.127
(-1.386) (-0.993)
Right Tail -0.215*** -0.192***
(-3.667) (-3.440)
RI (5d) * Right Tail 3.864*** 3.332***
(2.883) (2.641)
Control Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fund FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26,052 25,776 26,052 25,776 26,052 25,776
R-squared 0.130 0.156 0.130 0.156 0.130 0.156
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Panel B: Abnormal Return
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
RI (5d) 1.042*** 1.051*** 1.409*** 1.311*** 0.966*** 0.949***
(2.646) (2.694) (3.673) (3.553) (2.834) (2.846)
Positive -0.013* -0.013*
(-1.841) (-1.886)
RI (5d) * Positive 0.955 0.748
(1.212) (0.990)
Left Tail 0.113 0.119
(1.115) (1.167)
RI (5d) * Left Tail 1.561 1.715
(0.952) (1.045)
Right Tail -0.297*** -0.288***
(-3.764) (-3.962)
RI (5d) * Right Tail 6.800*** 6.350***
(3.492) (3.569)
Control Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fund FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,757 25,493 25,757 25,493 25,757 25,493
R-squared 0.132 0.158 0.132 0.158 0.133 0.158
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Table 2.5: Placebo Test: Unobserved Actual Top-10 Holdings
This table reports results of placebo tests based on actual top-10 fund holdings that are
unobservable to investors. The dependent variable is quarterly fund ow, and obser-
vations are at fund-quarter level. The variable of interest, Resumption Impact (5d), is
holding-weighted sum of 5-trading day post-resumption stock return, calculated based
on disclosed top-10 fund portfolio holdings that appear at the end of the concurrent
quarter, but not the end of the previous quarter. In the rst two columns, Resump-
tion Impact (5d), Fund Performance and Family Performance are measured using raw
returns. In columns (3)-(4), Resumption Impact (5d) is measured using stock-market ad-
justed abnormal return, and Fund Performance and Family Performance are measured
using stock- and bond-market adjusted abnormal return. The fund itself is excluded
when calculating family TNA and performance. All control variables are lagged by one
quarter. Standard errors are clustered at fund level, and t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. *, **, *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of signicance.
Raw Return Abnormal Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Resumption Impact (5d) -0.649 -0.783 0.182 -0.028
(-1.097) (-1.389) (0.321) (-0.053)
Fund Performance 0.322*** 0.338*** 0.397*** 0.418***
(8.250) (8.467) (11.602) (12.434)
Log TNA -0.071*** -0.072***
(-14.410) (-14.227)
Log Age -0.003 -0.001
(-0.365) (-0.092)
Log Family TNA 0.013** 0.014**
(2.409) (2.557)
Family Performance 0.216*** 0.111*
(3.685) (1.811)
Fund Return Volatility -0.192* -0.425***
(-1.778) (-3.981)
Purchase Fee -4.842* -7.599**
(-1.723) (-2.012)
Redemption Fee 12.608 3.670
(0.838) (0.173)
Expense Ratio 1.732 2.061
(0.242) (0.287)
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26,052 25,776 25,757 25,493
R-squared 0.129 0.155 0.131 0.157
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Table 2.6: Placebo Test: Unobserved Non-Top-10 Holdings
This table reports results of placebo tests exploiting the delay of fund disclosure of non-top-10 stock holdings
in annual reports. The dependent variable is quarterly fund ow. RI(5d) is the 5-day Resumption Impact
calculated using the top-10 holdings. Non-top-10 RI(5d) is the 5-day Resumption Impact calculated
using the non-top-10 holdings disclosed in fund annual reports. Column (1)-(4) measure stock and fund
performance using raw return, and column (5)-(8) use abnormal return. Column (1), (2), (5), and (6)
include all fund-quarter observations in the baseline sample, while column (3), (4), (7), and (8) exclude
fund-quarter observations where RI(5d) is non-zero and the quarter is not Q1. All control variables
are lagged by one quarter. Standard errors are clustered at fund level, and t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. *, **, *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of signicance.
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Raw Return Abnormal Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RI (5d) 1.059*** 1.069*** 1.325** 1.356** 1.120*** 1.114*** 1.468** 1.451**
(3.585) (3.626) (2.266) (2.338) (3.703) (3.692) (2.257) (2.246)
Non-top-10 RI (5d) -0.501 -0.580 0.547 0.474
(-0.483) (-0.560) (0.442) (0.381)
Fund Performance 0.343*** 0.343*** 0.316*** 0.316*** 0.426*** 0.427*** 0.408*** 0.409***
(8.590) (8.542) (7.313) (7.275) (12.713) (12.664) (11.178) (11.134)
Log TNA -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.069*** -0.069***
(-14.425) (-14.425) (-13.220) (-13.220) (-14.244) (-14.244) (-13.156) (-13.155)
Log Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005
(-0.358) (-0.354) (-0.726) (-0.721) (-0.094) (-0.098) (-0.481) (-0.484)
Log Family TNA 0.013** 0.013** 0.012** 0.012** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013** 0.013**
(2.447) (2.446) (2.231) (2.230) (2.606) (2.607) (2.383) (2.384)
Family Performance 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.113* 0.113* 0.033 0.033
(3.738) (3.738) (2.718) (2.718) (1.852) (1.847) (0.510) (0.505)
Fund Return Volatility -0.178* -0.180* -0.145 -0.148 -0.417*** -0.415*** -0.384*** -0.382***
(-1.655) (-1.669) (-1.240) (-1.259) (-3.918) (-3.893) (-3.324) (-3.306)
Purchase Fee -4.702* -4.708* -3.533 -3.540 -7.356* -7.343* -4.756 -4.747
(-1.666) (-1.669) (-1.197) (-1.200) (-1.929) (-1.923) (-1.051) (-1.048)
Redemption Fee 12.560 12.484 9.955 9.856 3.674 3.784 0.933 1.042
(0.822) (0.817) (0.606) (0.601) (0.170) (0.175) (0.044) (0.049)
Expense Ratio 1.757 1.748 4.936 4.925 2.152 2.164 5.380 5.390
(0.246) (0.245) (0.649) (0.647) (0.300) (0.301) (0.706) (0.708)
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,776 25,776 22,565 22,565 25,493 25,493 22,362 22,362
R-squared 0.155 0.155 0.162 0.162 0.158 0.158 0.165 0.165
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Table 2.7: Flow Response for Funds with Dierent Institutional Ratios
This table reports results on the heterogeneous responsiveness of individual ows and
institutional ows to Resumption Impact. High Institutional Ratio is a dummy variable
that equals to 1 if the fund ownership by institutional investors is above 50% according
to the most recent disclosure, and 0 otherwise. Denition of other variables are the
same as in the baseline specication. Standard errors are clustered at fund level, and
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of
signicance.
Raw Return Abnormal Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RI 0.815** 0.788** 0.875** 0.808**
(2.374) (2.351) (2.482) (2.343)
RI × High Inst. Ratio 1.492* 1.317* 1.705** 1.576**
(1.934) (1.816) (2.107) (2.043)
Fund Performance 0.308*** 0.326*** 0.394*** 0.413***
(7.844) (8.136) (11.200) (11.967)
Fund Perf. × High Inst. Ratio 0.123** 0.096* 0.064 0.076
(2.378) (1.878) (0.892) (1.089)
High Institutional Ratio -0.053*** -0.026*** -0.048*** -0.023***
(-6.766) (-3.197) (-5.868) (-2.632)
Log TNA -0.068*** -0.070***
(-13.755) (-13.564)
Log Age -0.004 -0.001
(-0.380) (-0.130)
Log Familiy TNA 0.013** 0.014**
(2.366) (2.571)
Family Performance 0.215*** 0.109*
(3.669) (1.781)
Fund Return Volatility -0.216** -0.449***
(-2.023) (-4.237)
Purchase Fee -4.588* -7.251*
(-1.695) (-1.898)
Redemption Fee 10.530 1.600
(0.707) (0.075)
Expense Ratio 2.078 2.453
(0.292) (0.342)
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26,052 25,776 25,757 25,493
R-squared 0.133 0.156 0.135 0.158
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Table 2.8: The 2015 Market Crash Period
This table shows results of the baseline regression using the sample excluding the 2015
market crash period observations. Crash period observations are fund-quarters observed
in 2015Q2 or 2015Q3. The dependent variable is quarterly fund ow. Column (1) and
(3) use non-crash-period observations, and column (2) and (4) use only crash-period
observations. Standard errors are clustered at fund level, and t-statistics are reported
in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% level of signicance.
Raw Return Abnormal Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Resumption Impact (5d) 1.026*** 0.825 1.140*** 0.649
(2.909) (1.288) (3.236) (0.943)
Fund Performance 0.364*** 0.409*** 0.440*** 0.528***
(8.471) (3.697) (12.553) (4.295)
Log TNA -0.067*** -0.026*** -0.068*** -0.029***
(-14.171) (-3.127) (-13.955) (-3.582)
Log Age 0.005 -0.068*** 0.007 -0.062***
(0.524) (-4.037) (0.733) (-3.680)
Log Family TNA 0.012** 0.006 0.013** 0.007
(2.280) (0.557) (2.469) (0.619)
Family Performance 0.157** 0.483*** 0.014 0.650***
(2.384) (2.746) (0.217) (2.614)
Fund Return Volatility -0.216** -0.916*** -0.482*** -0.739**
(-2.033) (-2.857) (-4.543) (-2.427)
Purchase Fee -4.665* -99.646* -7.144* -101.260*
(-1.649) (-1.722) (-1.866) (-1.761)
Redemption Fee 12.076 4.550 2.866 3.730
(0.764) (0.514) (0.131) (0.429)
Expense Ratio 1.197 0.387 1.618 -0.355
(0.171) (0.157) (0.231) (-0.140)
Fund FE Yes No Yes No
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,380 1,395 24,097 1,395
R-squared 0.159 0.081 0.161 0.085
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Table 2.9: Robustness: Horizon of Measuring Resumption Impact
This table shows that our main results are robust to constructing our variable of interest Resumption
Impact using stock resumption returns over various lengths of time. Column (1), (3), and (5) measures
stock and fund performance using raw return, and column (2), (4), (6) uses abnormal return adjusted for
exposure to stock and bond market factors. All control variables in the baseline specication are included
and their coecients are suppressed to conserve space. Standard errors are clustered at fund level, and
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% level of signicance.
n=3 n=7 n=10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Resumption Impact (n days) 1.233*** 1.343*** 1.012*** 1.183*** 0.914*** 1.012***
(3.372) (3.631) (3.910) (4.436) (3.735) (4.002)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,776 25,493 25,776 25,493 25,776 25,493
R-squared 0.155 0.157 0.156 0.158 0.156 0.158
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Table 2.10: : Robustness: Using More Accurate Portfolio Weight to Con-
struct Resumption Impact
This table reports results for the baseline regression using modied resumption impact
measure. The dependent variable is quarterly fund ow, and observations are at fund-
quarter level. The variable of interest, Resumption Impact (5d), is holding-weighted sum
of 5-trading day post-resumption stock return, calculated based on disclosed top-10 fund
portfolio holdings at the quarter end prior to the reference date. In the rst two columns,
Resumption Impact (5d), Fund Performance and Family Performance are measured
using raw returns. In columns (3)-(4), Resumption Impact (5d) is measured using stock-
market adjusted abnormal return, and Fund Performance and Family Performance are
measured using stock- and bond-market adjusted abnormal return. The fund itself is
excluded when calculating family TNA and performance. All control variables are lagged
by one quarter. Standard errors are clustered at fund level, and t-statistics are reported
in parentheses. *, **, *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of signicance.
Raw Return Abnormal Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Resumption Impact (5d) 1.285*** 1.261*** 1.333*** 1.269***
(3.736) (3.842) (3.905) (3.869)
Fund Performance 0.328*** 0.344*** 0.405*** 0.426***
(8.381) (8.593) (11.935) (12.714)
Log TNA -0.071*** -0.072***
(-14.433) (-14.252)
Log Age -0.003 -0.001
(-0.353) (-0.094)
Log Familiy TNA 0.013** 0.014***
(2.447) (2.606)
Family Performance 0.219*** 0.113*
(3.742) (1.853)
Fund Return Vol -0.177* -0.416***
(-1.647) (-3.915)
Purchase Fee -4.676* -7.331*
(-1.654) (-1.920)
Redemption Fee 12.618 3.758
(0.824) (0.174)
Expense Ratio 1.742 2.158
(0.244) (0.300)
Fund FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26,052 25,776 25,757 25,493
R-squared 0.130 0.156 0.132 0.158
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Table 2.11: Robustness: Trimming Extreme Flow Observations
This table shows that our main results are robust to excluding fund-quarter observations
where funds experience extreme ows. Column (1) and (3) use raw return to measure
stock return and fund performance, while column (2) and (4) use abnormal return ad-
justed for exposure to stock and bond market factors. Standard errors are clustered at
fund level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, and
1% level of signicance.
Trim at (2.5%, 97.5%) Trim at (5%, 95%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Resumption Impact (5d) 0.894*** 1.023*** 0.735*** 0.818***
(3.937) (4.534) (4.607) (5.115)
Fund Performance 0.210*** 0.268*** 0.125*** 0.161***
(8.933) (12.592) (7.838) (10.300)
Log TNA -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.021*** -0.021***
(-12.948) (-12.722) (-10.497) (-10.257)
Log Age 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006
(0.472) (0.714) (1.105) (1.338)
Log Family TNA 0.007** 0.008** 0.005** 0.006***
(2.283) (2.455) (2.534) (2.631)
Family Performance 0.110*** 0.055 0.073*** 0.051*
(2.988) (1.359) (2.862) (1.762)
Fund Return Volatility 0.004 -0.142** 0.130** 0.043
(0.057) (-2.044) (2.566) (0.849)
Purchase Fee -3.566** -4.804** -2.929** -5.251**
(-1.977) (-2.043) (-2.290) (-2.294)
Redemption Fee 5.734 0.975 5.632 5.608
(0.649) (0.081) (1.276) (0.857)
Expense Ratio -1.372 -1.029 -1.423 -1.176
(-0.398) (-0.298) (-0.461) (-0.378)
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,978 24,695 23,649 23,376
R-squared 0.182 0.185 0.209 0.213
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Table 2.12: Robustness: Time Window from Flow Quarter-End to Stock
Resumption Date
This table shows robustness of our main results to varying time window applied to
lter stock resumption events used to calculate Resumption Impact. Column (1) and
(3) use raw return to measure stock return and fund performance, Column (2) and (4)
use abnormal returns. Standard errors are clustered at fund level, and t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% level of signicance.
w=1 month w=3 months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Resumption Impact (5d) 1.060*** 1.096*** 0.629** 0.582*
(2.990) (2.894) (2.143) (1.916)
Fund Performance 0.343*** 0.424*** 0.341*** 0.422***
(8.581) (12.685) (8.534) (12.602)
Log TNA -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.072***
(-14.416) (-14.237) (-14.417) (-14.234)
Log Age -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(-0.368) (-0.101) (-0.356) (-0.091)
Log Family TNA 0.013** 0.014*** 0.013** 0.014***
(2.437) (2.595) (2.425) (2.580)
Log Family Performance 0.219*** 0.114* 0.219*** 0.112*
(3.736) (1.862) (3.735) (1.834)
Fund Return Volatility -0.177* -0.416*** -0.182* -0.419***
(-1.646) (-3.907) (-1.686) (-3.941)
Purchase Fee -4.693* -7.346* -4.729* -7.449*
(-1.665) (-1.930) (-1.681) (-1.954)
Redemption Fee 12.568 3.749 12.652 3.792
(0.826) (0.175) (0.839) (0.178)
Expense Ratio 1.781 2.161 1.712 2.091
(0.249) (0.301) (0.240) (0.291)
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,776 25,493 25,776 25,493




(a) 5-day raw returns following resumption
(b) 5-day abnormal returns following resumption
Figure 2.2: Binscatter plot of mutual fund return and resumption impact over 5 trading
days following stock resumption
Plot for all trading suspension events with at least 1% portfolio weight during 2004Q3-
2018Q2. Events are grouped into 100 bins. For each fund-stock event in this dataset,
trading suspension is required to occur before the reference date, so the fund holds the




A.1 Supplement Thomson Holdings Data Using CRSP Holdings
Data
The study presented in Chapter 1 utilizes mutual fund holdings data from both
CRSP and Thomson Financial databases. As researchers have previously pointed out,
the coverage of Thomson Financial holdings data suers from quality issues noticeably
since 2008 (Shive and Yun, 2013; Zhu, 2019). To obtain a more comprehensive coverage
for a longer sample period, I supplement Thomson holdings data using CRSP holdings
data. CRSP starts to include fund holdings data since 2003. For the entire sample
period used in this study, I nd 1,160 active U.S. equity mutual funds that have no
holdings data in Thomson but are included in CRSP holdings data. These funds either
do not exist in the Thomson holdings database, or are not picked up by the MFLINKS
link table that is used to link CRSP to Thomson.
In Table A.1, we can observe that there are some big time gaps between the
dates of the rst reported holdings data in CRSP and fund inception dates for the 1,160
funds. These are mostly due to funds that were started earlier before 2003 when CRSP
holdings data begin. Additional reporting gaps are due to limited coverage of CRSP
holdings data before 2008. The lackluster quality of CRSP holdings data until 2008
is also noted by Shive and Yun (2013), Schwarz and Potter (2016), and Zhu (2019).
Despite the limitations of earlier periods of CRSP coverage, I nd 466 entrant funds
that has holdings reported in CRSP within the rst 12 months following their inception
dates but are missing from the Thomson database. Table A.2 details the distribution
of these entrants over time. Note that the numbers pike around 2008, consistent with
ndings by previously mentioned researchers that CRSP has improved quality from 2008
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while Thomson started to suer from quality issues.
A.2 Additional Empirical Results for Chapter 1
A.2.1 Empirical Tests for Performance Dierences Between Hot and Cold
Style Entrant Funds Using the 19822015 Full Sample
This section present additional results of the main empirical tests for Chapter 1
using the full 19822015 sample. This sample includes 2,927 entrant funds, compared
to 2,801 for the 19912015 subsample. Table A.3 reports the t-tests for performance
dierences between hot and cold entrant funds of dierent style categories. Tables A.4
and A.5 present the results of the regression tests using the full sample. The results
show that including the additional 126 entrant funds does not have any big inuence on
the main results and conclusions. In addition, Tables A.6 and A.7 replicate the tests
in Section 1.4.2 that examine the performance of entrant funds relative to incumbent
funds. These tests are particularly important for the contribution of the study as they
distinguish the mechanism of entry threshold from alternative explanations such as stock-
level return reversal and fund competition eects. As the tables show, the results of these
tests in the full sample are similar to those for the 19912015 subsample.
A.2.2 Regression Tests with Dierent Clustering Methods
Tables A.8 and A.9 report t-statistics when dierent clustering methods are used
to compute standard errors for the main regression tests presented in Tables 1.3 and
1.4 in Section 1.4.1.2. For all regression specications, style xed eects are included.
The baseline calculates t-statistics with standard errors clustered by style-year groups.
For comparison, t-statistics are also calculated using robust standard errors, standard
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errors clustered by fund vintage year groups, and standard errors clustered by style
groups. The robust standard errors do not take into account the correlation among
residuals and likely exaggerates the statistical signicance of the coecients. Clustering
by style groups results in higher t-statistics in some cases and lower in others, compared
to the baseline. Clustering by year groups weakens the statistical signicance in all
cases. While it is reasonable to consider fund managers' abilities to generate superior
performance are correlated for funds in the same style category and for the same point
of time, the main concern of using either year and style as cluster is that there are not
enough number of clusters for group-level asymptotic to work well. Since there are only
25 year groups and 9 style groups, the paucity of clusters may lead to biased standard
errors (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The choice of using style-year group cluster allows for
meaningful correlation among observations, i.e., the abilities of funds that are opened
in the same year with same investment style may be correlated, while also provides
enough number of cluster groups to ensure reliable estimation. In addition, the results
in Table A.9 show that the regressions using past style performance as independent
variable yield statistically signicant coecients consistently across dierent standard
error calculation methods. This also lends condence to the main ndings of the study.
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Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Number of Months Between Fund Inception Date and the First
Holdings Report Date in CRSP Holdings Data
Only actively managed U.S. equity funds that have holdings coverage in CRSP but not
in Thomson are included.
N Min 10th Pctl 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl 90th Pctl Max
1,160 0 1 3 61 145 197 481
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Table A.2: Number of Entrant Funds that Have Holdings Coverage in CRSP
But Not in Thomson
This table details the number of entrant funds in CRSP that have missing holdings data

















Table A.3: Comparing Post-Entry Performance of Hot and Cold Style Entrant Funds (1982
2015)
An investment style is considered as in hot status if the TNA-weighted average returns of funds in the
style category minus the value-weighted CRSP index return in the previous 24 months is above the time-
series median of the entire sample. An entrant fund is considered as a hot style entrant fund if its initial
holding-based style at the time of its entry is in hot status. Post-entry performance is measured over the
36-month window after the month of the funds' inception date. If the fund is closed within the 36 months,
it is still included in the calculation. Return in excess of MKT is measured as the average fund monthly
return over the value-weighted CRSP index return. t-statistics of two sample mean tests are reported for
the dierence between average performance of hot and cold style entrant funds. The sample period is
19822015.
Small Mid Large
All Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value
Panel A: Number of Entrants
Hot 1,519 363 161 168 161 151 155 60 114 186
Cold 1,408 243 150 119 169 145 115 54 208 205
Total 2,927 606 311 287 330 296 270 114 322 391
Panel B: Return in Excess of MKT
Hot -0.039 0.021 0.078 0.117 -0.130 -0.093 0.040 -0.280 -0.196 -0.165
Cold 0.005 0.286 0.047 -0.021 -0.054 0.068 0.037 -0.094 -0.155 -0.172
Dierence -0.043 -0.265 0.032 0.138 -0.076 -0.161 0.002 -0.186 -0.041 0.007




All Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value Growth Blend Value
Panel C: CAPM Alpha
Hot -0.046 -0.020 0.010 0.038 -0.146 -0.065 0.049 -0.227 -0.124 -0.093
Cold 0.040 0.322 0.040 0.045 -0.024 0.111 0.050 -0.099 -0.098 -0.125
Dierence -0.086 -0.342 -0.030 -0.007 -0.122 -0.176 -0.001 -0.128 -0.026 0.032
t-stat -3.702 -4.933 -0.400 -0.073 -2.066 -2.682 -0.022 -1.705 -0.569 0.849
Panel D: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.044 0.061 -0.034 -0.055 -0.077 -0.100 -0.078 -0.115 -0.058 -0.114
Cold 0.019 0.305 0.016 -0.065 -0.016 0.099 -0.033 -0.040 -0.077 -0.154
Dierence -0.063 -0.244 -0.050 0.010 -0.061 -0.199 -0.046 -0.075 0.019 0.040
t-stat -3.072 -3.794 -0.785 0.155 -1.021 -3.465 -0.853 -1.144 0.448 1.190
Panel E: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
Hot -0.055 0.011 -0.038 -0.044 -0.090 -0.098 -0.066 -0.100 -0.072 -0.107
Cold 0.012 0.239 0.013 -0.021 -0.040 0.064 0.021 -0.075 -0.082 -0.121
Dierence -0.066 -0.228 -0.051 -0.022 -0.050 -0.162 -0.087 -0.025 0.010 0.014
t-stat -3.490 -3.852 -0.837 -0.332 -0.911 -3.010 -1.742 -0.388 0.255 0.492
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Table A.4: Regressions of Post-Entry Fund Performance on Hot Style
Dummy Variable (19822015)
This table reports results of regressions of fund performance in the m months immedi-
ately following its entry on a dummy variable that equals one if the entrant fund belongs
to a hot style category at the time of entry. The dependent variables are measured by
return in excess of the value-weighted CRSP index return, the CAPM alpha, the Fama-
French 3-factor alpha, and the Carhart 4-factor alpha. Each fund entry during the period
of 19822015 contributes to one observation in the regressions reported here. Fund style
xed eects are included in all specications. The t-statistics reported are calculated
using standard errors clustered at style-year level.
m Coef. t-stat N Adj. Rsq.
Panel A: Return in Excess of MKT
12 -0.059 -0.57 2,927 0.020
24 -0.053 -0.69 2,927 0.022
36 -0.073 -1.23 2,927 0.029
60 -0.106 -2.47 2,927 0.043
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
12 -0.107 -1.06 2,927 0.017
24 -0.102 -1.33 2,927 0.019
36 -0.109 -1.84 2,927 0.025
60 -0.140 -3.22 2,927 0.038
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
12 -0.116 -1.72 2,927 0.017
24 -0.079 -1.64 2,927 0.029
36 -0.081 -2.18 2,927 0.028
60 -0.047 -1.83 2,927 0.021
Panel D: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
12 -0.117 -1.77 2,927 0.017
24 -0.083 -1.79 2,927 0.025
36 -0.083 -2.48 2,927 0.022
60 -0.050 -2.20 2,927 0.012
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Table A.5: Regressions of Post-Entry Fund Performance on Past Style Per-
formance (19822015)
This table reports results of regressions of fund performance in the m months immedi-
ately following its entry on past style performance. The dependent variables are mea-
sured by return in excess of the value-weighted CRSP index return, the CAPM alpha,
the Fama-French 3-factor alpha, and the Carhart 4-factor alpha. Past style performance
is measured by the value-weighted average return of all incumbent funds in the same
style category in excess of the value-weighted CRSP index return in the past 24 months.
Each fund entry during the period of 19822015 contributes to one observation in the
regressions reported here. Fund style xed eects are included in all specications. The
t-statistics reported are calculated with standard errors clustered at style-year level.
Panel A: Return in Excess of MKT
12 -0.168 -0.87 2,927 0.023
24 -0.211 -1.35 2,927 0.032
36 -0.197 -1.55 2,927 0.041
60 -0.200 -2.29 2,927 0.057
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
12 -0.204 -1.08 2,927 0.020
24 -0.258 -1.70 2,927 0.033
36 -0.239 -1.86 2,927 0.042
60 -0.248 -2.85 2,927 0.060
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
12 -0.307 -3.01 2,927 0.030
24 -0.262 -3.64 2,927 0.053
36 -0.211 -3.54 2,927 0.052
60 -0.113 -2.91 2,927 0.030
Panel D: Fama-French 4-Factor Alpha
12 -0.282 -2.84 2,927 0.028
24 -0.263 -3.77 2,927 0.050
36 -0.202 -3.80 2,927 0.042
60 -0.110 -3.30 2,927 0.021
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Table A.6: Regressions of Post-Entry Fund Performance Relative to Peers
on Hot Style Dummy Variable (19822015)
This table reports results of regressions of fund performance relative to peers in the
m months immediately following its entry on a dummy variable that equals one if the
entrant fund belongs to a hot style category at the time of entry. The dependent vari-
ables are measured by dierences in return in excess of the value-weighted CRSP index
return, the CAPM alpha, the Fama-French 3-factor alpha, and the Carhart 4-factor al-
pha between the entrant fund and the value-weighted average of incumbent funds in the
same style category. Each fund entry during the period of 19822015 contributes to one
observation in the regressions reported here. Fund style xed eects are included in all
specications. The t-statistics reported are calculated using standard errors clustered at
style-year level.
m Coef. t-stat N Adj. Rsq.
Panel A: Return in Excess of MKT
12 -0.113 -1.95 2,927 0.017
24 -0.092 -2.18 2,927 0.020
36 -0.086 -2.31 2,927 0.024
60 -0.048 -1.64 2,927 0.026
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
12 -0.096 -1.79 2,927 0.023
24 -0.097 -2.36 2,927 0.030
36 -0.092 -2.56 2,927 0.035
60 -0.064 -2.23 2,927 0.032
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
12 -0.130 -2.32 2,927 0.020
24 -0.101 -2.46 2,927 0.029
36 -0.109 -3.20 2,927 0.033
60 -0.071 -2.67 2,927 0.028
Panel D: Fama-French 4-Factor Alpha
12 -0.118 -2.16 2,927 0.021
24 -0.105 -2.56 2,927 0.031
36 -0.101 -3.02 2,927 0.034
60 -0.075 -2.84 2,927 0.027
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Table A.7: Regressions of Post-Entry Fund Performance Relative to Peers
on Past Style Performance (19822015)
This table reports results of regressions of fund performance relative to peers in the
m months immediately following its entry on past style performance. The dependent
variables are measured by dierences in return in excess of the value-weighted CRSP
index return, the CAPM alpha, the Fama-French 3-factor alpha, and the Carhart 4-
factor alpha between the entrant fund and the value-weighted average of incumbent
funds in the same style category. Past style performance is measured by the value-
weighted average return of all incumbent funds in the same style category in excess of
the value-weighted CRSP index return in the past 24 months. Each fund entry during
the period of 19822015 contributes to one observation in the regressions reported here.
Fund style xed eects are included in all specications. The t-statistics reported are
calculated using standard errors clustered at style-year level.
m Coef. t-stat N Adj. Rsq.
Panel A: Return in Excess of MKT
12 -0.164 -1.84 2,927 0.018
24 -0.165 -2.68 2,927 0.024
36 -0.144 -2.27 2,927 0.029
60 -0.097 -2.06 2,927 0.030
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
12 -0.128 -1.55 2,927 0.024
24 -0.168 -2.89 2,927 0.036
36 -0.151 -2.53 2,927 0.041
60 -0.117 -2.65 2,927 0.038
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
12 -0.216 -2.51 2,927 0.025
24 -0.207 -3.84 2,927 0.040
36 -0.197 -4.01 2,927 0.045
60 -0.140 -3.74 2,927 0.039
Panel D: Fama-French 4-Factor Alpha
12 -0.186 -2.16 2,927 0.024
24 -0.222 -3.88 2,927 0.046
36 -0.191 -3.85 2,927 0.048
60 -0.144 -3.81 2,927 0.039
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Table A.8: Regressions of Post-Entry Entrant Performance on Hot Style
Dummy Variable: Inferences with Dierent Clustering Methods (19912015)
This table reports t-statistics calculated with dierent clustering methods for the regres-
sions of fund performance in the m months immediately following its entry on hot style
dummy variable.
m Coef. t-stat N Adj. Rsq.
Style x Year Robust Year Style
Panel A: Return in Excess of MKT
36 -0.071 -1.13 -2.64 -0.71 -1.39 2,801 0.029
60 -0.107 -2.34 -5.11 -1.44 -2.88 2,801 0.042
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
36 -0.108 -1.70 -4.27 -1.06 -1.85 2,801 0.024
60 -0.143 -3.08 -7.20 -1.95 -3.20 2,801 0.038
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
36 -0.075 -1.88 -3.43 -1.33 -1.81 2,801 0.026
60 -0.041 -1.50 -2.40 -1.18 -1.64 2,801 0.016
Panel D: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
36 -0.078 -2.18 -3.81 -1.49 -2.21 2,801 0.018
60 -0.045 -1.89 -2.78 -1.53 -2.61 2,801 0.008
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Table A.9: Regressions of Post-Entry Entrant Performance on Past Style
Performance: Inferences with Dierent Clustering Methods (19912015)
This table reports t-statistics calculated with dierent clustering methods for the regres-
sions of fund performance in the m months immediately following its entry on past style
performance.
m Coef. t-stat N Adj. Rsq.
Style x Year Robust Year Style
Panel A: Return in Excess of MKT
36 -0.202 -1.55 -4.58 -1.01 -1.51 2,801 0.042
60 -0.204 -2.28 -6.44 -1.44 -2.28 2,801 0.058
Panel B: CAPM Alpha
36 -0.246 -1.87 -5.82 -1.21 -1.75 2,801 0.044
60 -0.254 -2.87 -8.24 -1.81 -2.95 2,801 0.062
Panel C: Fama-French 3-Factor Alpha
36 -0.209 -3.33 -6.13 -2.61 -2.23 2,801 0.047
60 -0.108 -2.64 -4.55 -2.09 -1.90 2,801 0.024
Panel D: Carhart 4-Factor Alpha
36 -0.199 -3.56 -6.22 -2.69 -2.68 2,801 0.038
60 -0.105 -3.02 -4.61 -2.43 -2.77 2,801 0.016
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